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Currently, most teachers in the United States are paid on a single-salary schedule 
that provides uniform increases for additional credentials and years of experience to all 
teachers in a given district. These kinds of contracts were mainly instituted during the 
1940s as a way to equalize pay between elementary and high school teachers, with 
additional pay for credentials serving as an appeasement to secondary teachers, more of 
whom were male and held masters degrees (Murphy, 1990). Although they served for 
many years to equalize gender disparities in pay, in the last several decades researchers 
have begun to question whether an unintended consequence of the single-salary schedule 
has been a reduction in quality of teachers who both enter and remain in teaching.  In 
addition, although individual teacher salaries are typically calculated by a combination of 
credentials and experience, another problematic feature of these compensation schemes is 
the fact that there is usually no pay differentiation between teachers’ skills and 
knowledge.  Because all teachers with similar experience and education within a district 
are treated equally in terms of pay, teacher salaries are unresponsive to labor market 
realities in which workers command different wages, depending on the demand for 
specific skills and knowledge.  By contrast, single salary schedules fail to provide 
incentives for teachers with skills that are in-demand in non-teaching fields, such as in 
mathematics and science.  Despite these issues, for the most part the salary schedule 
remains an intractable feature of the majority of teacher contracts. 
 Meanwhile, there is extensive evidence to suggest that a chronic shortage of 
teachers in fields like mathematics and science, as well as foreign languages, bilingual 
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and special education, do exist and has persisted from at least the 1940s until present day 
(Ingersoll & Perda, 2010). Basic supply and demand theory suggests that the market 
response to shortage is for prices to increase. Thus, if teacher labor markets were 
unconstrained, the wage for teachers in shortage fields would rise.  However, because of 
the salary schedule, instead there is market failure in which shortages persist, seemingly 
indefinitely. To correct these specialized teacher shortages, economists have 
recommended incentivizing teacher salaries to be more responsive to market conditions, 
by paying premiums for qualified teachers in shortage fields (Kershaw & McKean, 1962; 
Levin, 1985). 
 However, there has been strong resistance to changing the single salary schedule.  
Although this resistance has frequently been attributed to union resistance, these 
compensation schemes, which came into favor many decades before public school 
teachers gained collective bargaining rights, are also common across right-to-work states 
and remain an intractable feature of the way teachers are paid. Therefore, historically few 
districts have implemented pay plans that are designed to address shortages in specific 
teaching fields, and there is very little empirical evidence to support the efficacy of labor 
market incentives for either improving recruitment or increasing retention of shortage 
field teachers.   
It is this gap in the literature that this dissertation seeks to address.  I begin by 
addressing whether shortage field incentives work as theory predicts they should; namely, 
I examine whether the minority of public school districts that do offer shortage-field 
incentives report better recruitment conditions and experience higher rates of retention of 
shortage field teachers than comparable districts that do not offer incentives. I also 
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explore whether incentives serve as an effective mechanism for raising the quality of 
shortage field teachers recruited into districts.  Once I explore these two issues between 
districts, I will further explore whether these two outcomes respond to changes within 












Review of the Literature 
Are There Teaching Shortages? 
Beginning in the 1980s, American public schools began to grapple with reports 
that predicted a “perfect storm”: an aging teacher population heading toward retirement 
would meet historic increases in student enrollments.  In the three decades since those 
warnings were first sounded, a teacher shortage has surfaced as predicted, but its causes 
have now been attributed to the protractedly short careers of many new teachers, rather 
than to a confluence of demographic trends. The problem is not one of supply, rather 
each year large numbers of teachers leave their public sector teaching jobs for reasons 
other than retirement (Ingersoll, 2001).  This phenomenon means that teacher attrition 
patterns are u-shaped, such that the greatest turnover occurs in the early years, and toward 
retirement (Dolton & van der Klaauw, 1999). 
Although teacher attrition around retirement is to be expected, much of the policy 
concern is focused on early career teachers who exit the profession at high rates.  For 
example, Ingersoll estimates that within the first five years of teaching, approximately 46 
percent of new teachers will leave the classroom (Ingersoll, 2001, 2003).  Ingersoll 
derives his estimates from four waves of the Schools and Staffing Survey, collected 
between 1987 and 2000. Using these data, he estimates that after the 2nd year, almost 24 
percent of new teachers have left teaching, but more recent findings from the 2009-2010 
school year places the two-year new teacher attrition rate at 12.5 percent (Kaiser & Cross, 
2011), or half the estimate from the previous decade.  At present, however, it is unclear 
whether the more recent findings are due to long-term changes in teacher attrition trends, 
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or if the lower rates are a temporary outgrowth of overall high unemployment rates in the 
national labor market.   
Although the number reported by Ingersoll is frequently cited and discussed as 
being too high, whether rates of turnover amongst young teachers are actually higher than 
the turnover rates for other early career workers is debatable. For example, Loprest finds 
that the average voluntary job change rate for workers within their first four years is 
between 22 and 24 percent (Loprest, 1992), while Royalty estimates that after the first 
year of working, just 55 percent of all young workers remain in the same job (Royalty, 
1998). However, she also finds that more educated workers under 30 have lower average 
turnover rates of between 18-20 percent per job tenure.  Together, these findings suggest 
that there is variation in turnover of young workers that is likely intimately linked to both 
sector, and worker qualifications. 
 To that end, other studies seek to make direct comparisons between turnover in 
teaching and non-teaching careers.  For example, one study found that young teachers are 
more likely to leave teaching than young nurses are to leave nursing, which is thought to 
be a comparable profession due to high participation of women, and the social service 
nature of the work involved (Ingersoll, 2001).  However, Harris and Adams (2007) also 
compared teachers to nurses, as well as to social workers and accountants, and found that, 
at the aggregate, teacher turnover rates were similar to these other professions, and 
concluded that differences that did exist were largely driven by the earlier retirements of 
teachers at the upper end of the age spectrum, rather than by the turnover of younger 
teachers.   
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One factor that may make turnover in teaching difficult to compare to other 
professions is the fact that teaching is one of only a few heavily female dominated 
professions.  This distinction is important because research on the wider labor market 
finds differences in turnover and its relationship to how men and women negotiate career 
decisions around issues of marriage and childrearing.  Specifically, women are far more 
likely to leave jobs for non-employment family options than men (Royalty, 1998).  Thus, 
exit rates in teaching may be somewhat exacerbated by the decisions of substantial 
portions of women teachers who leave their jobs for family reasons (Stinebrickner, 2002; 
Wayne, 2000).  One study found that after the first four years in the profession, female 
teachers are considerably more likely than male teachers to exit teaching for non-
employment reasons (Stinebrickner, 2001).  Although these kinds of exits do contribute 
to the overall turnover rates in teaching, many of them are temporary, and evidence also 
suggests that 25-35 percent of the pool of teachers from which districts hire is comprised 
of teachers re-entering the profession (Ingersoll & Perda, 2010; Wayne, 2000).   
One issue that is not clear in the literature is whether the continued female 
dominance in teaching is related to its perceived family-friendly structure.  In other 
words, do more women continue to select into teaching because of its reputation as a 
career that can be more easily balanced with family responsibilities than other kinds of 
careers?  If this is the case, policy prescriptions designed to stem attrition may need to 
account for the non-employment reasons many women leave teaching, as well as 
consider how to alter recruitment efforts to capitalize on changing social norms around 
gender and child-rearing. For example, one survey that asked teachers about non-
monetary incentives that could induce them to remain in the same district found that more 
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than half of teachers would stay in a district if employer-provided daycare were a benefit 
(Kelly, Tejada-Delgado, & Slate, 2010).  
 
The Problem with Attrition 
Whether or not teacher attrition is comparably higher than other professions, for 
men or women, there are nevertheless policy concerns about the distribution of new 
teacher attrition amongst different kinds of schools.  In particular, schools that serve 
comparatively high proportions of poor and minority students are also more likely to 
experience higher turnover, and have greater difficulty filling vacancies than are other 
schools, even within the same school district (Goldhaber, Gross, & Player, 2010; 
Ingersoll & Perda, 2010; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002).  For example, in Chicago, 
although the overall annual teacher retention rate is 80 percent, every five years a 
majority of schools in that city loose over half of their teaching staff. After four years, 
schools with the highest attrition rates retain less than 30 percent of their teachers 
(Allensworth, Ponisciak, & Mazzeo, 2009).  These kinds of findings illustrate the 
magnitude of the problem of new teacher turnover, concentrated in urban schools. At the 
same time, high-poverty schools also present greater professional challenges for teachers, 
and there is also significant evidence to suggest that the rapid turnover of new teachers in 
these schools is linked to teacher dissatisfaction with low status, poor working conditions 
and low salaries (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Darling-Hammond, 2004; Loeb & Darling-
Hammond, 2005).  
Teacher shortages are also not evenly distributed across geographic areas.  For 
example, because of a combination of increases in population growth, combined with the 
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added burden of efforts to maintain a sweeping statewide class-size reduction policy, 
shortages have been more problematic in California, which is home to about eight percent 
of the nation’s school children, than in many other states (Podgursky, 2006).  Other 
Western states and some in the South, Southeast, and Northeast have also experienced 
difficulties filling vacancies, while states in the Midwest have comparatively less 
difficulty (Murphy, DeArmond, & Guin, 2003).    
Furthermore, because of evidence that new teachers, particularly those in their 
first three years in the classroom, do not perform as well as their more experienced peers 
(Kane, Rockoff, & Staiger, 2006; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004), there 
is concern that schools that are staffed primary by novice teachers and face constant 
turnover also systematically provide a lower standard of educational opportunity than 
schools with more stable and experienced teaching staffs (Lankford et al., 2002).  High 
levels of churn undermine a school’s organizational capacity to implement either 
coherent curricular reforms, or develop collaborative relationships amongst staff (Guin, 
2004).  Chronic turnover also drains instructional expertise from schools, and deprives 
them of appropriate mentors for novice teachers (Darling-Hammond, 2004).  Recent 
research findings also suggest that there is a significant and negative impact of constant 
teacher churn within schools on student achievement (Ronfeldt, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2012).   
Other concerns about chronic turnover in some schools and districts are based on 
the idea that transaction costs associated with the constant effort to replace new teachers 
strains the resources of districts that are already financially constrained.  Although it is 
difficult to assess the exact costs of turnover within each district, and costs differ between 
districts, one study places the cost per novice teacher replacement at between a low of 
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$4,366 for a small, rural district, and a high of $17,872 for a large urban district (Barnes, 
Crowe, & Schaefer, 2007). Another study estimates an average new teacher replacement 
cost of $9,061 per teacher (Milanowski & Odden, 2007). Reducing turnover of new 
teachers, therefore, is also associated with potentially substantial cost savings for public 
schools.  
Conversely, some have argued that teacher turnover can be beneficial, if the least 
effective teachers are the ones leaving the profession.  To that end, there is mixed 
evidence about retention rates based on various measures of teacher quality.  For 
example, some studies find that teachers with stronger academic backgrounds, as 
measured by quality of their undergraduate institution, are more likely to leave teaching 
(Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2005; Hoxby & Leigh, 2004), while other studies 
have found similar results for teachers who had high ACT or SAT scores (Podgursky, 
Monroe, & Watson, 2004; Stinebrickner, 2001).   
College board scores and academic competitiveness are, however, arguably weak 
indicators of pedagogical talent, and findings are mixed regarding whether or not the 
most effective teachers, as measured by student achievement, are more likely to remain in 
teaching.  While some studies have found that the most effective teachers are the most 
likely to stay in the classroom (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2009; 
Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, & Rivkin, 2005), others have found greater subtlety in 
variation in attrition across the effectiveness distribution.  For example, several studies 
find that the greatest teacher mobility rates are found at both the lowest and highest ends 
of the effectiveness distribution, as measured by teacher value-added contributions to 
student achievement on standardized tests (Goldhaber et al., 2010; West & Chingos, 
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2009).  Furthermore, the Goldhaber et al. study finds that while the least effective 
teachers tend to either leave teaching, or to transfer to other schools in the same district, 
the most effective teachers are more likely to leave the profession all together.  
 
Shortages in Teaching Subfields 
In addition to the chronic shortages in teaching attributed to turnover in more 
recent decades, shortages of qualified math and science teachers have been documented 
as far back as the 1940s and 1950s, when the percent of mathematics teachers without a 
major or minor in math ranged from 35-60 percent in different states. Shortages in the 
sciences were even worse, with fewer than 20 percent of chemistry teachers having 
majored in chemistry, and fewer than 10 percent of physics teachers having majored in 
physics, in some states (Levin, 1985). Furthermore, these numbers have held steady for at 
least 60 years, such that more recent figures suggest that nationally, 30 percent of 
secondary mathematics teachers did not major or minor in either mathematics or related 
fields such as engineering (Ingersoll, 1999).  Moreover, although the supply of new math 
and science teachers in the past decade has kept pace with both teacher retirements and 
increases in demand created by increases in curricular requirements in mathematics and 
science, there is some evidence that the greatest source of shortages comes from the fact 
that more teachers of these subjects leave either their school or the profession pre-
retirement than do teachers of other subjects (Ingersoll & Perda, 2010; Murnane & Olsen, 
1990). For example, in one study, after three years of teaching, 30 percent of those with 
majors in mathematics, engineering or the natural sciences had left teaching, compared to 
14 percent of those who had majored in education (Henke, Zahn, & Carroll, 2001). 
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In addition to pre-retirement exits in mathematics and science subject areas, other 
subfields face shortages based in the supply pipeline of qualified teachers.  For example, 
the shortage of qualified Special Education and English as a Second Language (ESL) 
teachers are both subject areas in which there are simply not enough qualified teachers to 
meet demand (Billingsley & McLeskey, 2004; Diaz-Rico & Smith, 1994; Murphy et al., 
2003).  The shortages in these areas, however, are potentially worsened by existing 
policy.  For example, federal NCLB legislation requires that, in order to be considered 
“highly qualified”, secondary special education teachers must be certified in both special 
education and the content area of expertise, potentially creating excessive barriers to 
entry to the teaching of this sub-field (Billingsley & McLeskey, 2004).  Additionally, 
many schools of education have failed to keep pace with rapidly changing student 
demographics, and have been slow to incorporate the development of bilingual/ESL 
teachers into their curricula (Diaz-Rico & Smith, 1994), which has meant that not enough 






Opportunity Costs and Declines in Quality  
There are two kinds of teacher supply problems. There are supply shortages 
caused by lack of adequately prepared teachers, and shortages created by excess attrition.  
Both kinds of supply problems impact the ability of schools to staff classrooms with 
qualified, effective teachers.  The first kind of supply problem can be caused either by 
policies that create barriers to entry, like those that impact the training and recruitment of 
special education and bilingual teachers, or by a failure of qualified people to choose to 
enter the profession.  While the supply shortages created by policy barriers are relatively 
easier to both identify and correct, shortages caused by self-selection, as well as those 
created by higher rates of turnover amongst math and science teachers, can be understood 
through economic models of how both workers and employers create appropriate job 
matches across the labor market. 
Specifically, economic theory suggests that workers self-select into occupations 
for which they are likely to receive the highest possible remuneration.  The Roy Model 
(Roy, 1951) describes how, if the skills required to do two jobs are equal, but the 
potential wages of one are more compressed than the other, then the highest quality 
workers will select into the occupation with the greatest wage dispersion, even when 
average wages are the same.  This is because the most productive workers will assume 
that their own superior ability will place them in the top end of the salary distribution.  
One implication of this model is that there will be an unequal distribution of quality 
between the two professions, which will lead to decreases in productivity in the 
profession with more wage compression.  The implication of this model for teaching is 
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that highly able graduates will have an incentive to choose non-teaching options, if they 
can earn substantially higher wages in those fields.  
For mathematics and science teachers, who can command greater financial 
rewards in the private sector than other teachers (Bradely & Loadman, 2005), the 
empirical evidence supports the theoretical model.  Specifically, the single salary 
schedule, which offers considerably more compressed wages than are found in the private 
sector market for professionals generally (Vigdor, 2008), provides significantly lower 
salaries than are frequently available to college graduates with degrees in math and 
science related subject areas.  Thus, these graduates face greater opportunity costs to 
teaching that do teachers of other subjects.  Research estimates indicate that beginning 
salary differentials for graduates with technical majors are almost $2,000 between 
teaching and non-teaching jobs (Goldhaber & Liu, 2005).  Additional findings also 
suggest that secondary teachers face an almost $3,400 greater annual opportunity cost to 
teaching than do elementary school teachers (Goldhaber & Player, 2005).  Although these 
numbers are not large, they may be consequential.  One study found that each $1,000 
predicted starting wage increase for teaching is associated with between three and four 
percent growth in interest in the field reported by college students majoring in technical 
subjects (Milanowski, 2003).  Based on these figures, an increase in starting salary of 
$4,000 could increase the supply of potential shortage-field teachers by as much as 16 
percent.  With 485,800 bachelor’s degrees granted in science and engineering fields in 
20071, such a raise in starting salaries could potentially increase the national math and 
science teacher supply by 77,728.  A starting salary raise increase of $5,000 would serve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Data	  found	  at	  NSF:	  National	  Center	  for	  Science	  and	  Engineering	  Statistics	  http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind10/c2/c2h.htm	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to nearly satisfy President Obama’s call for 100,000 new math and science teachers 
(Obama, 2011). 
Evidence of comparatively low starting salaries only demonstrates opportunity 
cost decisions faced by early career shortage-field teachers and non-teachers. However, 
as discussed above, teacher retention is also a pressing issue that disproportionately 
impacts shortage-field subjects, where the average stay of science teachers has been 
found to be between two to seven years shorter than the average elementary school 
teaching career (Murnane & Olsen, 1989, 1990).  Moreover, differential exit rates imply 
that opportunity costs continue into mid-career, where the salary gap between math and 
science related teaching and non-teaching careers grows to as much as 25 percent, 
favoring non-teaching careers.  This is compared to the differential for people with 
education degrees, which is roughly 17 percent (Goldhaber, DeArmond, Liu, & Player, 
2008).  In addition, after a career interruption, those teachers who chose to re-enter 
teaching are those who have fewer opportunities for wage increases outside of teaching 
(Beaudin, 1993).  These studies support the notion that the lock-step salary schedule 
becomes less attractive as teachers gain experience (Vigdor, 2008), and may help explain 
the high turn-over of shortage field teachers, who start out their careers on closer footing 
with their non-teaching peers, but who notice themselves falling behind as they move into 
mid-career. Combined, these studies serve to illustrate that shortage-field teachers face 
additional opportunity costs to stay in teaching, compared to other teachers. 
One caveat to these findings is that potential salary losses and attrition are not 
uniform across different types of labor markets.  This is because some local labor markets 
provide greater comparative wages, depending on the demands of the local non-teaching 
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economy.  To that end, Rumberger (1987) found that districts located in areas with high 
concentrations of engineers, indicating high levels of demand for those kinds of 
credentials, reported greater shortages of mathematics and science teachers, as well as 
greater levels of teacher turnover within those markets. 
 
Reductions in Teacher Quality 
As predicted by the Roy Model, the opportunity costs created by wage 
compression in teaching have also led to documented declines in teacher quality.  For 
example, aggregate levels of decline in the academic preparation and average skill levels 
between current teachers and those who taught in the past have been observed.  In 
particular, historical shifts in the labor market for women have precipitated changes in the 
measureable characteristics of the teacher corps over time.  Specifically, the impact of 
salary schedule constrained wages was less relevant when women had fewer occupational 
opportunities.  In the 1940s, teacher salaries were relatively higher than those for other 
occupations open to college educated women.  However, as those women moved into 
other careers, relative teacher salaries dropped considerably, making teaching steadily 
less financially attractive to the kinds of women who had filled those jobs in the past 
(Hanushek, Rivkin, Rothstein, & Podgursky, 2004).  The effect of this shift of women 
into significantly more non-teaching occupations has been that for the highest performing 
female graduates, the opportunity cost to teaching has also increased.  Although teaching 
is still dominated by women, the academic ability of those in the profession has shifted 
downward such that, even though the mean academic achievement level of teachers has 
fallen only slightly since mid-century, the number of high achieving women who enter 
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the profession has dropped dramatically (Corcoran, Evans, & Schwab, 2002; Hoxby & 
Leigh, 2004). 
In addition to changes in women’s employment, the decline in teacher quality has 
also been linked to technological progress, which has served to increase the specialized 
skills of workers in non-teaching fields, but which has not affected the productivity of 
skilled teachers.  This phenomenon occurs because the skills required for teaching have 
remained relatively unchanged since the inception of public schooling (Tyack & Cuban, 
1995).  The result of the stasis of skills needed within the teaching profession has actually 
been the decline of the skill and knowledge required of teachers, relative to other non-
teaching occupations (Lakdawalla, 2001).  Thus, although teaching was once one of the 
most intellectually challenging occupations open to smart young workers, the advances 
made in almost all other professional category jobs has dramatically shifted the dynamic.   
Overall, the documented evidence of opportunity costs, combined with evidence 
of decline in the quality of teachers suggests that the Roy Model predictions about the 
consequences of compressed wages are applicable for understanding the dynamics of 
teacher retention difficulties, particularly as related to teachers of mathematics and 
science.   
 
Imperfect Information and the Recruitment of Teachers 
Although the Roy Model may be effective for illuminating issues of teacher self-
selection into the teaching profession, it is limited in its usefulness for understanding how 
schools and districts select teachers from within the existing pool of applicants.  Because 
the model does not address principal agent information asymmetries in the hiring process, 
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it may be helpful to temper teacher labor market understanding with further theoretical 
models of the role of imperfect quality information on market dynamics.  Specifically, in 
Akerlof’s Lemons model, uncertainty about the quality of the good being offered serves 
to drive high quality goods from the market.  This occurs because buyers will pay lower 
prices if they have a reasonably high enough probability of actually purchasing a lemon 
(Akerlof, 1970).  This model provides a useful lens for understanding the market for 
teachers because the attributes of a quality teacher are hard to both define and measure, 
particularly before a teacher actually starts teaching. 
The problem of hiring high-quality teachers is two-fold.  The first problem is that 
the goal of schooling has been both vague and controversial.  Historically, competing 
ideas regarding the purpose of education have made it difficult to either identify or 
evaluate good teachers.  Social and political debate about the purpose of public schooling 
itself has created an environment in which there is a lack of clarity around determining 
what goals a good school and a good teacher should pursue.   
For example, for many decades, beginning with Horace Mann’s common schools 
and through the development of Carnegie Units and the comprehensive high school, the 
policy debate over public education has swung between the two opposing ideals of 
democracy and capitalism (Carnoy & Levin, 1985; Tyack & Cuban, 1995).  Although 
many authors have addressed these societal tensions and their role in framing public 
education policy, Labaree (Labaree, 1997) goes a step further by outlining the history of 
education reform as an evolutionary process that has moved from a tension between the 
economy and society, into a single mission of individual consumerism, that is still in the 
process of emerging today. In this conception, Labaree describes deep tensions between 
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the conviction that the primary purpose of schooling is to raise good citizens and enhance 
social cohesion through the transmission of common knowledge and values, and the 
belief that the primary purpose of schooling is to create good workers, prepared to slot 
into the various strata of the labor market.  Historically, the socio-political environment 
swung between these competing ideals, and ultimately gave rise to the development of a 
massive public institution that nonetheless had ambiguous aims.  This system lacked 
policy coherence, and for decades the role of teachers was caught within it, in such a way 
that it was necessarily impossible to define good teaching.  Essentially, although is seems 
obvious that good teachers must be able to facilitate learning, the problem of determining 
quality in carrying out this end is highlighted if the question is reframed against the 
backdrop of conflict over what students should be learning: is the teacher who is best 
suited to molding good citizens, the same as the teacher best suited to shaping agile 
workers? Which end should the individual teacher pursue?  Thus because historically the 
desired product of schooling was both debated and poorly articulated the role of teacher 
was also unclear.  This lack of clarity of goals gave rise to a “loosely coupled” system 
that manifested as a lack of connection between teacher inputs and outputs (Weick, 
1976). 
Given this policy backdrop, hiring quality teachers has been complicated, both by 
the lack of clarity about the role of teachers, and the fact that the kind of teachers that 
different schools and districts wish to hire likely differed significantly as well.  This 
complexity has meant that, because it is unclear what teachers should be able to do, the 
signals of quality have been weak.  Therefore, the second problem in the hiring of 
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teachers is that identifying a quality teacher at the point of hire is difficult if the ultimate 
role of teaching is up for debate.   
As previously discussed, the traditional single salary schedule rewards teachers 
for the acquisition of credentials, advanced degrees, and experience.  These are also the 
criteria that have generally been used to indicate qualified applicants in the teacher labor 
pool.  Because these indicators are not tied to output, they may also be well suited to 
systems of identification and reward within an institution in which the productive aim is 
ambiguous.   
However, as described by Labaree, the competing goals in education have begun 
more recently to give way to what he calls the single social mobility goal.  This goal 
conceptualizes education as an individual commodity, rather than a public good.  
Proponents of this view believe that education is a private good, the purpose of which is 
to obtain credentials that will make individuals competitive in the labor market.  They 
also believe that the allotment of education should be handled in a meritocratic manner.  
The purpose of education is to allow individuals to obtain comparative advantage, but 
that advantage should be allotted on merit, rather than on such inequitable criteria as 
social position, or family. Therefore, by combining individual labor market ends with a 
system of merit-based delivery, the social mobility goal can also be seen as an emerging 
hybrid of the two earlier policy goals.   
Moreover, the increasing dominance of the social mobility goal can be seen as the 
impetus behind many modern educational developments and reforms, including judicial 
decrees around desegregation and the development of educational adequacy legislation, 
as well as the No Child Left Behind act, all of which can be characterized as efforts to 
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make educational competition more fair.  One important outgrowth of these 
developments has been the development of data systems designed to measure whether or 
not educational enterprises are meeting the aims with which they have been charged.  
Namely, as policy makers and reformers have coalesced around the social mobility 
conception of education, they have also demanded that the existing “loosely coupled” 
education system be made accountable for ensuring equitable educational access through 
the development of measureable outcomes (Hannaway & Mittleman, 2011).  For the most 
part, the indicators that have been developed are standardized tests of individual student 
achievement.  While these evaluations have been used to track student progress, their 
increasing prominence has also highlighted gross educational inequities that serve to 
undermine the mobility ideal.  
Thus, it is through the very recent and growing availability and analysis of data, 
that the problem of identifying and hiring quality teachers has become apparent.  On the 
one hand, individual teacher ability has been found to be profoundly related to student 
achievement (Rockoff, 2004), with differences in teacher quality across schools linked to 
as much as 7.5 percent of the variation in student achievement (Hanushek, Kain, & 
Rivkin, 1998).  On the other hand, most of the teaching qualifications that have 
traditionally been used to indicate quality, and that can be assessed from a resume, such 
as undergraduate degree, certification, and advanced teaching degrees have been found to 
have either weak or no relationships to student performance (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, 
Rockoff, & Wyckoff, 2008).  
At the same time, the teacher-level indicators that have shown the strongest 
positive relationship to student achievement, such as teaching experience (Hanushek et 
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al., 2005) and National Board Certification (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2011), can only 
be measured after a teacher has been teaching for some time (i.e. teachers are ineligible to 
apply for National Board Certification until they have a minimum of 3 years of 
experience2).  Value-added models, which measure the effectiveness of individual 
teachers on student achievement scores, also require teachers to have some experience 
with students in classrooms to be utilized.  These factors mean that schools and districts 
must hire teachers without indicators of quality that are reliable at the time hiring 
decisions are made. 
Meanwhile, in the absence of observable quality at the time of hire, employers 
will nonetheless rely on signals of quality, such as undergraduate institution or major, to 
proxy for actual ability (MacLeod & Urquiola, 2009; Spence, 1973).  The lack of reliable 
indicators of teacher effectiveness and the reliance on weak signals means that there is 
quality uncertainty in the market for new teachers, especially those that are 
inexperienced.  The Lemons model predicts that in this kind of scenario, the salary 
offered to new teachers will be depressed, and not aligned with what highly skilled 
teachers are actually worth.  Because human resources personnel are likely unable to 
accurately predict from the hiring process which candidates will either be great teachers, 
or which ones will leave the profession prematurely, low starting salaries may serve to 
save districts from investing resources in teachers who may have high probabilities of 
revealing themselves to be lemons.  In this framework, the implication of this theoretical 
model is that even without being resource constrained, districts might still offer low 
starting salaries if teacher quality uncertainty is high. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  http://www.nbpts.org/become_a_candidate/eligibility_policies	  
	  	  
23	  
However, the model also predicts that when a mid-level salary is actually offered, 
it will serve to further dilute the quality of teachers in the market by attracting low quality 
teachers, who can get a higher salary then their actual skills should warrant.  All of this 
suggests a potential reason for the continuing wage gap between teachers and non-
teachers with equal education, which is that private sector employers may offer higher 
salaries and greater wage dispersion if they are hiring for industries in which college 
majors and degrees provide greater certainty of a match between observable 
qualifications and productivity, than can be found in teaching.   
 
Evidence on Quality Teacher Hiring 
Because of the tension between the difficulty in identifying quality teachers from 
the point of hire and the need to simultaneously raise the quality of teachers, in more 
recent years, policy makers have made efforts to improve the pre-hire information about 
teachers that is available to schools and districts. For example, many states have adopted 
to use of competency tests to be used as screening mechanisms for prospective teachers.  
By setting an objective floor, these tests are designed to prevent the least qualified from 
entering the classroom.  However, evidence indicates that the predictive value of these 
tests differs across racial subgroups of both teachers and students.  Specifically, 
Goldhaber and Hansen (2010) found that Black students who were assigned a Black 
teacher who scored in the low end of the distribution of scores on teacher competency 
exams performed as well as Black students assigned a high-performing White teacher.  
These findings highlight that hiring quality teachers may also be difficult, in part, because 
measures designed to provide objective signals of quality are nevertheless subject to 
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context, and that the most appropriate matches may need to be made using a variety of 
both objective and subjective indicators. 
To that end, several other studies examine the predictive value of subjective pre-
hire information about teachers, including teacher self-report surveys about such issues as 
ability, content knowledge, and personality, and rigorous screening interviews used by an 
alternative certification program (Rockoff, Jacob, Kane, & Staiger, 2008; Rockoff & 
Speroni, 2011).  Both of these studies found some positive predictive value in terms of 
identifying teachers who had positive impacts on student achievement.  However, both 
also concluded that combinations of traits were more indicative of quality than any single 
identifiable elements alone.  In addition, while both of these studies indicate that it is 
possible to develop more rigorous systems for screening and hiring effective teachers, it 
is a process that is complex, and will likely require that school districts significantly 
increase the resources they dedicate to the hiring process.  Although the process is still in 
its nascency, together, these studies represent a glimmer of how teacher hiring may be 
able to move forward to reduce information uncertainty, and provide more justification to 
allow districts to increase salaries and attract more qualified teachers.  
Overall, the Labaree and Lemons frameworks compliment each other.  One 
highlights the consequences for both prices and quality when observable indicators are 
unreliable, while the other illuminates the socio-historical policy context that has served 
to create uncertainty in the market for teachers.  At the same time, the second also 
provides a theoretical lens for understanding the current evolution from a system 
dominated by uncertainty to one in which reforms are designed to increase what is known 
about teachers by tightening the relationship between their input and the student 
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achievement output.  Moreover, the empirical evidence serves to support the notion that 
established indicators of teacher quality are inadequate to support the goals of the 
emerging theoretical construct.  Research findings also indicate that although new models 
of more tightly coupled teacher signaling mechanisms are possible, there is much that 
remains unknown about how to develop screening tools that efficiently identify those 
teachers who will be best situated to carry out the emergent schooling goals around 
equity and individual student achievement.  
 
The Policy Prescription and Evidence on Economic Incentives 
 As discussed above, economic theory suggests that one way to attract more and 
better qualified secondary math and science teachers is to offer them higher salaries than 
their counterparts in the elementary grades, or even in other secondary subjects.  The Roy 
Model implies that salary differentials would serve to reduce the greater opportunity costs 
to teaching faced by shortage-field teachers.  These differentials are also hypothesized to 
increase teacher quality because equalizing wages between teaching and non-teaching 
would mean that income rewards were no longer an effective sorting mechanism.  Salary 
differentials could also be effective for changing recruitment of shortage-field teachers if 
teaching provides not just lower salaries than other professions open to graduates with 
training in shortage-field subjects, but if it is also perceived as offering worse working 
conditions, such as less autonomy, fewer opportunities for advancement, inadequate 
supplies and materials, or greater potential exposure to violence or germs, for example.  
In this case, higher salaries could provide what is known as a compensating differential, 
which is the additional amount of incentive necessary to induce workers to take a job that 
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provides worse working conditions to other jobs available requiring the same background 
or skills (Smith, 1979).  
Despite the theory, there is little research evidence on whether or not financial 
incentives for shortage field teachers are actually effective, and the evidence that is 
available provides a mixed picture. For example, controlling for other factors such as 
school demographics and conditions, similar schools that pay more are able to attract 
both new and experienced teachers with better credentials (Figlio, 2002).  In addition, a 
program in North Carolina that offered an annual $1,800 bonus to certified shortage-field 
teachers who worked in high-needs schools reduced mean turnover rates by 17 percent, 
with the strongest impacts on math teachers as well as those with relatively more 
experience (Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2008).   
By contrast, a signing bonus program in Massachusetts that paid new recruits 
$20,000 over three years to receive training and teach in high-needs schools was found to 
be ineffective for stemming attrition when large numbers of recruits nevertheless left 
teaching in the first few years of the program (Fowler, 2003; Liu, Johnson, & Peske, 
2004).  What these findings suggest is that although pay incentives may be ineffective for 
addressing initial principle agent information problems at the point of hire, they may be 
somewhat more effective for increasing motivation and stemming attrition from the field 
for those teachers who have already demonstrated commitment to the classroom beyond 
the entry level years.   
The scarce evidence on differentiated pay in the public school arena is mostly due 
to lack of implementation.  However, differentiated pay is used routinely in other 
educational sectors.  Most notably, it is common in higher education for engineering, 
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medical, and law faculty to earn considerably more than their counterparts in more 
traditional academic fields (Tuckman & Tuckman, 1976).  However, although salary 
variation in higher education has been defended as a reflection of non-academic market 
demand for skills, there is also evidence that gender bias plays an independent role in 
faculty salary setting at the post-secondary level.  Specifically, Bellas (1997) finds that 
over time, there is an inverse relationship between average disciplinary salaries and the 
proportion of women faculty in a given subject area, suggesting that salaries become 
depressed by the entrance of women into given disciplines.  Additionally, the same study 
finds that greater wage dispersion undermines worker satisfaction, productivity, and 
collaboration amongst faculty.  Although these findings are for faculty within the same 
department, rather than across departments, they provide some evidence of potential 
unintended consequences of differentiated pay.  
Differentiated pay is also frequently used in private schools, which pay premiums 
for math, science and special education teachers (Ballou & Podgursky, 2001).  However, 
despite these practices, there is little empirical evidence to indicate whether or not the 
policies either reduce retention, or improve the quality of the shortage-field educators in 
these settings. Moreover, the most relevant findings suggest that, despite the greater 
flexibility in compensation available to administrators in private schools, teacher attrition 
is nevertheless higher amongst private school teachers, as compared to their public school 
counterparts (Guarino, Santibanez, & Daley, 2006; Ingersoll, 2001). 
Overall, the argument for differentiated pay in public schools is that implementing 
it will both increase quality and stem attrition of shortage field teachers. However, 
despite the fact that differentiated pay is utilized in other educational settings, these 
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outcomes have not actually been studied in those settings, so there is scarce comparative 
evidence of their efficacy.  Moreover, the impact on outcomes that have been studied, 
particularly in higher education, suggest potential unforeseen consequences of 
differentiated pay policies, such as increased gender bias in pay, and decreases in staff 
cohesion.   
That said, in the absence of flexibility in teacher compensation schemes, there is 
also evidence that public schools will provide non-monetary inducements in order to 
retain high quality teachers.  In particular, one study found evidence that elementary 
school principals provided more favorable classroom conditions, including those with 
more high achieving math students, lower percentages of IEP and ELL students, and 
ratios favoring female students, to teachers with higher competency exam scores, and 
those who had achieved higher value-added with prior classes (Player, 2010).  These 
findings are suggestive because they indicate that not only could differentiated pay 
arguably increase equitable distribution of teachers by removing the school incentive to 
reward the best teachers with more favorable classes, increases in salary in areas where 
there are shortages could possibly help lower-performing students obtain greater access 
to the most qualified teachers. 
Finally, there is some evidence that salary enhancements may need to be 
considered as both corrections to opportunity cost mechanisms, and as compensating 
differentials, at least in terms of keeping teachers in the lowest performing schools, where 
teachers have been found to leave as much for reasons of salary as for poor working 
conditions (Darling-Hammond, 2004).  That said, in a further investigation of turn-over 
in low performing schools, women teachers were found to be unresponsive to salary 
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bonuses when the decision was to remain in schools where working conditions were poor 
(Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004).  
 
Other Financial Incentives in Teaching 
Currently, many policy and research discussions center around the idea of 
changing teacher compensation to make teaching more closely tied to student 
achievement.  The push to incentivize teachers to raise student test scores is also part of 
the social mobility shift in educational goals that seeks to move away from a loosely 
coupled school system to one in which inputs and productive output are more closely tied 
together.  While shortage-field incentives are designed to create shifts in the labor market 
that will ultimately lead to more high quality teachers entering and remaining in the 
classroom, another class of policy incentives around teachers’ labor are also currently in 
vogue.  Namely, a variety of policy experiments in recent years have offered teachers 
financial incentives to increase student achievement on standardized tests.  The theory 
behind these kinds of incentives is that teachers will work harder to improve student 
performance if they know that doing so will earn them a personal reward.  The 
assumption behind these kinds of incentives is that student performance has been weak in 
the existing institutional structure because teacher effort was loosely coupled from 
student output.  Teacher effort is seen as one of the main determinants of student 
performance, thus bringing these elements closer together will necessitate both more 
teacher effort, and higher student performance.  Although both shortage-field incentives 
and performance incentives are rooted in the same over-arching theoretical model, they 
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aim to address different aspects of teachers’ work, and have also been found to have 
different outcomes. 
 Namely, although financial incentives have shown some success in helping to 
keep shortage-field teachers in the classroom, the evidence that financial rewards are 
successful at raising quality, or increasing motivation for teachers once they are in the 
classroom is mixed.  For example, Lavy (2002) finds that schools that competed for and 
won financial rewards did experience some improved outcomes for students, such as 
reduced drop-out rates, and increases in student acquired credit hours, compared to 
similar schools that were not eligible to compete.  On the other hand, a similar 
randomized group incentive plan administered to schools in New York City did not result 
in any significant differences in either student achievement, or most teacher outcomes 
(Fryer, 2011; Goodman & Turner, 2009).  In addition, even when teachers were paid 
large performance-based bonuses, measurable differences in student achievement gains 
on standardized tests were not found (Springer et al., 2010).  
 Overall, the research that has been done on pay enhancements for teachers 
provides a muddy picture of how teachers respond to pay-based incentive policies.  
However, those that provide positive impacts seem to do so on issues related to supply 
and retention, while those that are related to improving quality seem to be more likely to 
have null findings.  Nevertheless, the dearth of evidence and the mixed findings from 
what does exist, particularly about differentiated pay, suggests a need for more evidence 
















My research focuses on three aspects related to the role of shortage-field incentives in 
recruitment and retention of teachers with specialized skills.  
1. I begin by examining whether the presence of incentives in a district impacts 
teacher attrition. Are shortage-field teachers in districts that offer shortage-field 
incentives more likely to be retained after one year than similar teachers in 
districts that did not offer shortage-field incentive? 
2. Second, I examine whether the presence of shortage-field incentives impacts 
recruitment of shortage-field teachers in those districts. Specifically, I examine 
whether districts that offer incentives are able to recruit shortage-field teachers 
with stronger academic backgrounds than districts without incentives.  
3. My next research question asks whether changes to shortage-field incentive 
policies over time lead to changes in shortage-field teacher recruitment or 
retention outcomes.  Districts that change their incentive policy by either adopting 
a new incentive policy or abandoning an old one are expected to experience 
accompanying changes in teacher outcomes. In this set of analyses I examine 
whether or not these changes actually occur.  
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Data and Methods 
Data 
The Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) for 1999-2000, 2003-2004, and 2007-
2008 provide nationally representative survey data about schools and teachers. These 
three combined waves of the SASS contain data from 106,930 public school teachers in 
6,540 public school districts, from all 50 states. Included in these surveys is information 
about districts that do and do not offer shortage field incentives, as well as information on 
whether surveyed teachers were retained one year after the initial survey was collected.  
The data also include information about teachers’ backgrounds.  For a full description of 
all variables used in these analyses, please see Appendix Table 1. 
 
Methods 
A comparison of means for shortage-field teachers in public school districts 
pooled from the three survey waves show significant differences between teachers in 
districts that did and did not offer shortage-field incentives (Table 1)3. These results 
suggest that districts that offer shortage-field incentives are more often located in rural 
and urban areas, as well as in the South and West.  These districts also have higher 
percentages of Black and Hispanic students, as well as higher percentages of students 
eligible for free or reduced price lunch.  Although more rural districts offer incentives, 
they impact more urban teachers.  Specifically, the mean number of teachers sampled in 
each rural district is 9, compared to 27 in each urban district.  Thus in these surveys, there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Although	  there	  are	  only	  a	  total	  of	  6,540	  unique	  districts	  in	  the	  3	  waves	  of	  SASS,	  these	  data	  are	  for	  more	  than	  12,	  000	  districts.	  This	  discrepancy	  reflects	  that	  fact	  that	  many	  districts	  were	  surveyed	  more	  than	  once,	  and	  applied	  different	  shortage-­‐field	  incentive	  policies	  in	  the	  different	  years	  they	  were	  surveyed.	  Thus,	  districts	  were	  counted	  based	  on	  their	  incentive	  and	  survey	  year	  status,	  so	  some	  districts	  were	  counted	  more	  than	  once.	  Demographics	  reflect	  the	  mean	  for	  the	  district	  year.	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are almost 11,000 teachers teaching in urban districts that offer shortage-field incentives, 
compared to 7,300 teaching in rural districts that provide the benefit.  Nonetheless, these 
descriptive findings provide prima facie evidence of non-random distribution of shortage-
field incentives among districts. 
 
Table 1:  
Character i s t i c s  o f  Distr i c t s  that Do and Do Not Offer  Shortage- f i e ld Incent ives  
Variable Name 
(at district level) 
Shortage-field Incentives 
(n=2,030) 
No Shortage-field Incentives 
(n=10,460) 
District Mean % Black 0.16 0.10 
District Mean % Hispanic 0.18 0.08 
District Mean % in lunch program 0.47 0.38 
Urban 0.20 0.10 
Suburban 0.40 0.41 
Rural 0.40 0.48 
South 0.44 0.29 
Midwest 0.21 0.33 
Northeast 0.09 0.18 
West 0.25 0.20 
*T-statistic mean differences significant at the p<.001 level. Suburban not significant. 
 
Causal Framework: Research Questions 1 & 2 
The fact that certain kinds of districts are more likely to provide shortage field 
incentives introduces selection bias into the data, jeopardizing the ability to make causal 
inferences about any potential incentive effects.  A straight comparison of outcomes 
between districts that do and do not provide shortage-field incentives is likely to conflate 
the effect of incentives themselves with other district characteristics that have known 
relationships to teacher recruitment and retention outcomes.  For example, high-poverty 
schools are known to be associated with higher teacher turnover, therefore, given that 
districts with more high-poverty students are also more likely to offer shortage-field 
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incentives, it is difficult to parse the direction of causality for the impact of those 
incentives on teacher retention.  A straight comparison of teacher retention between 
districts that do and do not offer shortage-field incentives would likely capture only the 
difference in outcomes between high and low poverty districts.  In order to identify the 
impact of incentives themselves, rather than the effect of other district characteristics that 
are associated with the outcome, I utilize an analysis strategy that creates a comparison 
group that is similar enough to the treatment group that received the incentives to indicate 
what would have happened, had the shortage-field incentives not been implemented in 
the districts that utilized them.  
In order to address the selection bias between districts that choose to offer 
shortage-field incentives and those that do not, I utilize a two-stage least squares 
instrumental variable (IV) approach.  In this method, I utilize a variable that is related to 
the policy of interest—the offering of shortage-field incentives—but which related to the 
outcomes only through the policy of interest, in order to create a natural experiment in 
which assignment to treatment or control conditions is driven by a source of variation that 
is external to the model (Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1993; Angrist & Pischke, 2009; 
Gelman & Hill, 2007).  Because assignment to treatment is exogenous this method allows 
me to create a plausible counterfactual control group, permitting valid causal inferences 
about whether shortage-field incentives increase retention and increase the quality of 
teachers recruited. 
In this case, I exploit the exogenous variation provided by teacher union 
representation.  Specifically the two major national teachers unions, the American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA), have 
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differing official platforms on the use of differentiated pay for shortage-field teachers. 
While both organizations state that they favor the maintenance of a strong single-salary 
schedule as a measure of base pay, the NEA explicitly does not support additional pay for 
teachers in hard-to-staff subjects.  Their justification for opposing subject-specific pay 
enhancement is that doing so “sends the signal that we value certain subjects over others 
and destroys internal equity” (Roekel, 2008).  The AFT, on the other hand, supports 
placing teachers in shortage-fields, such as mathematics, science, and special education, 
higher on the salary schedule when they begin teaching (Goldhaber, 2009; Where We 
Stand: Teacher Quality, 2003). 
Given the divergent views on shortage-field incentives of the nation’s two largest 
teachers’ unions, I hypothesize that AFT or NEA union affiliation is likely significantly 
related to whether or not a local district’s teaching contract provides shortage-field 
incentives to teachers in shortage-fields.  At the same time, I hypothesize that the 
affiliation of a district’s teachers’ union is unrelated to the recruitment or retention of 
teachers in shortage-fields within districts because teachers are unlikely to choose to 
remain in teaching because of the national affiliation of their labor union.  Union 
affiliation itself is also unlikely to be related to the quality of teachers recruited into 
districts, because teachers are unlikely to choose the work in a given district because of 
its union affiliation.  Moreover, union affiliation is also unlikely to cause districts to 
systematically hire more qualified candidates than other districts, represented by other 
unions. 
In addition, whether a given districts’ teachers are represented by the NEA or the 
AFT is, in most cases, a historical artifact related to the different development, growth 
	  	  
37	  
and competition of the two unions for members during and leading up to the period when 
collective bargaining laws were first enacted, rather than to specific district 
characteristics (Murphy, 1990).  The divergent development of the two unions makes 
union affiliation a potentially robust variable that provides a strong source of exogenous 
variation between districts. Furthermore, while specific union representation will likely 
strongly influence the type of pay contracts offered to shortage field teachers within 
given districts, union affiliation alone is unlikely to directly effect the retention of those 
teachers in teaching, or the recruitment of quality teachers into districts.   
 
Analysis Sample: Research Questions 1 & 2 
The Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) does not contain information on local 
union affiliation.  Therefore, in order to create the union instrument variable, I utilized 
publically available data on teachers unions and manually assigned NEA or AFT to the 
districts in SASS, which could only be identified by linking them to the Common Core of 
Data. I began this process by utilizing lists of state and local union affiliates available on 
the state level websites of the NEA and the AFT.  However, because these lists were 
incomplete, I followed this process by conducting searches of local news reports about 
teachers’ unions, as well as searches of legal documents involving local teachers’ unions.  
Other sources of evidence included documents such as copies of negotiated teachers’ 
contracts posted by policy research organizations, and state labor relations boards.  I was 
able to find positive information on union affiliation for 67 percent of the districts in the 
analysis sample.  For the most part, districts where local union affiliation was not found 
are smaller suburban and rural districts.  In addition, a small minority of districts are 
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represented by local unions that are unaffiliated with either of the two national teachers’ 
unions.   
In order to focus the analysis on the kind of wage agreements that are negotiated 
by the different unions, I limited the sample to states that require full collective 
bargaining for public sector unions. I did not include five states that have no collective 
bargaining rights (GA, NC, SC, TX, VA).  I also did not include states with weaker 
“meet-and-confer” negotiation rights (AL, AR, AZ, CO, KY, LA, MO, MS, UT, WV, 
WY)4.  In addition, in order to ensure that within-state comparisons could be made, I 
further limited the sample to states in which both the AFT and the NEA have local 
affiliates.  The AFT is a much smaller union than the NEA, and does not have any K-12 
local teacher affiliates in some rural states.  In total, I eliminated 12 states for lack of 
union variation (AK, DE, HI, IA, ID, ME, ND, NE, NV, SD, VT).  Because the District 
of Columbia has only one school district, represented by one union, it was also 
eliminated.  Moreover, the NEA and the AFT have merged in four states and these were 
also eliminated from the sample (FL, MN, MT, NY), as were a handful of districts where 
local district affiliation is with both unions.  Finally, I eliminated New Mexico from the 
sample because collective bargaining laws in that state were allowed to sunset in 2000 
(Lindy, 2011).  Although they were re-authorized in 2003, this was in the middle of the 
second wave of SASS, and it is unclear whether teachers in the SASS sample would have 
been subject to collectively bargained contracts. After all of these restrictions on the data, 
as well as the exclusion of teachers in districts with missing national union affiliation, the 
final analysis sample includes 26,230 teachers in 18 states. Because of the sample 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Public employees in Missouri gained the right to collectively bargain in May, 2007, which is just before 




limitations, any results are likely generalizable only to the population of teachers who 
teach in states with similar union contract negotiating rights.   
In addition, because the sample contains data from teachers in less than half of the 
nation, the design weights that accompany the SASS were not utilized.  These weights 
were created for the purpose of making findings from SASS nationally representative and 
generalizable to the entire population of teachers in the United States.  Findings from 
these analyses do not make a claim of being generalizable to the entire population of 
teachers.  Rather, any findings reported here are generalizable only to specific subgroups 
of public school teachers, working under certain policy conditions.  
 
Methods: Research Questions 1 & 2 
Retention Outcomes:  My first outcome measure is a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether a teacher was retained in their school for one year following the initial 
survey.  Teachers’ self-reported follow-up information is only available from the subset 
of teachers who participated in the Teacher Follow-Up Survey (TFS).  Therefore, to 
construct this variable for all the teachers in SASS in my analysis sample, I utilized the 
teacher status survey item, which was collected from schools as a preliminary indicator of 
teacher whereabouts one year after the survey.  Participating schools were sent a 
questionnaire asking whether each teacher who had been surveyed in the previous year 
was still teaching at the same school one year later.  Survey item choices included if the 
teacher was at the same school, if the teacher was at another school, no longer teaching, 
or deceased.  Because the item does not indicate if teachers who moved schools also 
remained in the same district, I constructed a dichotomous outcome of retention 
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indicating whether or not a teacher remained at the same school, after one year.  I also 
constructed a dichotomous outcome indicating if the teacher remained in the teaching 
profession.   
 
Analytic Model: Research Question 1 
The key assumption of this model is that shortage-field incentives specifically, 
and not a bundle of work conditions or contract provisions associated with AFT 
affiliation, have a causal relationship to retention of shortage field teachers.  To test this 
premise, I utilize an IV difference-in-differences model in which the excluded instrument 
is the interaction of the dichotomous union affiliation variable with the dichotomous 
indicator of whether a teacher is a shortage-field teacher.  Teachers in AFT affiliated 
districts who do not teach in shortage-fields should not be impacted by the availability of 
shortage-field incentives within their district.  Therefore, by controlling for other 
potential fixed difference between AFT and NEA teachers, a difference in outcomes 
between shortage and non-shortage field teachers represented by the AFT increases the 
likelihood that results are driven by the incentives themselves, and not by union 
affiliation as a whole.  This model allows for an outcome that makes specific distinctions 
between shortage and non-shortage field teachers in AFT and NEA districts.  In addition, 
it serves to increase the plausibility that the exclusion restriction is satisfied because it 
increases the likelihood that the identified relationship is through shortage field 
incentives, rather than through some other unmeasured pathway between union affiliation 
and either recruitment or retention outcomes.    
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Thus, in the first stage of this model, I predict the likelihood that a district will 
offer shortage-field incentives to shortage-field teachers if the teachers’ union is affiliated 
with the AFT.  I then use that predicted variable to further predict whether a given 




where D is modeled as the likelihood that district k offers shortage field incentives, as a 
function of whether the teachers’ union in district k is affiliated with the AFT, controlling 
for a vector of other covariates, as well as state and survey year fixed effects for teacher i 
in school j. The second stage takes the form:  
 
 
where Y is the probability that teacher i in district k is retained for one year after the 
initial survey.  This outcome is a function of D-hatik which is the predicted likelihood that 
shortage field teacher i in AFT district k taught in a district that offered incentives; Xijk is 
a vector of teacher, school, and district covariates; state and survey year fixed effects are 
included, and in both stages, eijk is the uncorrelated error term.  
Covariates in both stages are designed to control for known associations between 
school environment and a given teacher’s experience at work.  For example, there is 
evidence of strong relationships between teacher turnover, the level of poverty in a 
school, and the ethnic composition of students (Darling-Hammond, 2004; Hanushek, 
Kain, et al., 2004).  Therefore, control variables include district urbanicity, school percent 
! 
Dk = Zk (AFT * shortfield) + Xk (AFT) + Xi(shortfield) + XijkB + Sstate + Ssurvey + eijk
! 
Yik = aijk +D
"
ik+ Xk (AFT) + Xi(shortfield) + XijkB + Sstate + Ssurvey + eijk
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Black and Hispanic students, school size, school percent of students classified as English 
learners (ELL), school percent of students eligible to receive free or reduced lunch, 
school percent of students with individual evaluation plans (IEPs), whether a school is a 
charter school, teacher age, gender and years of experience, school level taught, whether 
teacher is fully certified, and whether the teacher is a new teacher (less than 3 years 
experience).  In order to control for variation in state teacher labor market conditions, I 
also include state fixed effects in the model. In addition, to control for potential 
confounding factors associated with time specific changes in external labor market 
conditions between the first and last data collection periods, I include survey year fixed 
effects in the model.  
 
Methods: Research Question 2 
Recruitment Outcomes: In order to investigate the impact of shortage-field 
incentives on recruitment, I will utilize two different recruitment outcomes.   
Given that the presence of economic incentives are hypothesized to increase the 
quality of teachers who will be attracted to teaching, I will also utilize an outcome that 
measures quality of teachers’ academic background.  However, because teacher quality is 
both difficult to define and measure, the data do not contain any direct measures of 
teacher quality.  Thus, I will use a proxy measure of teacher academic ability.  Following 
several studies that have utilized data on competitiveness of teacher undergraduate 
institution as measured by Barron’s college rankings (Angrist & Guryan, 2004; Boyd et 
al., 2008; Clotfelter et al., 2011; Hoxby & Leigh, 2004), to indicate teacher quality I will 
construct an outcome measure of teacher quality by matching the SASS teachers’ 
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undergraduate institution to the ranking the school received from Barron’s in the decade 
during which the teacher graduated. Specifically, the file of Barron’s rankings available 
from NCES provides the ranking assigned to a given school for the years 1972, 1982, 
1992, and 2004.   
The Barron’s rankings are constructed from several measures of the academic 
quality of undergraduate students enrolled in a particular institution, including High 
School GPA and class rank, as well as median SAT and ACT scores, and percentage of 
students accepted of those that applied.  All of the categories changed in terms of 
admission averages over the years, particularly in relation to the SAT and ACT scores of 
admitted students (full rankings criteria by decade can be found in Appendix Table 2).  
Therefore, I assigned the teachers who graduated 1967-1976 the 1972 ranking; teachers 
who graduated 1977-1986 were assigned the 1982 ranking, teachers who graduated 1987-
1996 were assigned the 1992 ranking, and all teachers who graduated 1997-2006, which 
is the latest year a teacher could have graduated and been surveyed for the last year of the 
SASS, were assigned the 2004 ranking.   
To construct a ranking index variable, I created a 9-point scale in which the most 
competitive colleges were ranked 9, and those rated as non-competitive were coded as 1.  
Some of the colleges ranked in three of the categories- highly competitive, very 
competitive, and competitive- also include “plus” ratings, meaning that specific colleges 
are ranked at the higher-end of their ranking category.  To account for these nuances in 
ranking, I created additional categories, which I called “Highly Competitive Plus”, “Very 
Competitive Plus”, and “Competitive Plus”.  This allowed me to expand the scale from 
including 6 ranking categories, to including 9.   
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I also conducted a robustness check of this quality measure by analyzing whether 
shortage-field teachers in districts with shortage field incentives are significantly more or 
less likely to be teaching out-of-field, as defined by the field of their undergraduate 
major.  To construct this measure I utilized data from SASS on teacher assignment and 
major field of Bachelor’s degree.  Teachers with bachelor’s degrees in math, science, or 
other related fields such as statistics or engineering, were coded as having a STEM 
degree.  If they were also assigned to teach math or science, they were counted as being 
an in-field teacher. Teachers with degrees in special education, who were also teaching 
special education classes were coded as being in-field teachers as well.  Finally, teachers 
who had degrees in teaching English as a second language, bilingual education, or 
Spanish and who were assigned to teach bilingual classes were also coded as infield 
teachers. 
 
Analytic Model: Research Question 2 
In the first stage of this model, I again predicted the likelihood that a district 
offered shortage-field incentives to shortage-field teachers if the district teachers’ union 
is affiliated with the AFT.  In the second stage, I use that predicted variable to further 
predict whether districts with shortage-field incentives hired teachers who graduated from 
more competitive undergraduate institutions, or were more likely to employ teachers 
teaching in-field.  The first stage of the model for the recruitment outcomes is identical to 




Dik = Zk (AFT * shortfield) + Xk (AFT) + Xi(shortfield) + XijkB + Sstate + Ssurvey + eijk
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where D is modeled as the likelihood that teacher i in district k teaches in a district that 
offers shortage field incentives, as a function of whether the teachers’ union in district k 
is affiliated with the AFT, controlling for a vector of other covariates, as well as state and 
survey year fixed effects for teacher i in school j.  
The second stage takes the form:  
 
 
where, in the first recruitment outcome, Y is the competitiveness of the undergraduate 
institution of teacher i in district k.  For the measure of in-field teaching, Y is a 
dichotomous outcome in which Y is the likelihood that teacher i in district k has a 
bachelor’s degree in the subject in which he/she is assigned to teach. 
Each of these outcomes is a function of D-hatik which is the predicted likelihood 
that shortage field teacher i in AFT district k taught in a district that offered incentives; 
Xijk is a vector of teacher, school, and district covariates; state and survey year fixed 
effects are included for the district recruitment outcome.  In both stages, for all outcomes, 
eijk is the uncorrelated error term.  
Covariates in both stages again include district urbanicity, school percent Black 
and Hispanic, school size, school percent of students classified as English learners (ELL), 
school percent of students eligible to receive free or reduced lunch, school percent of 
students with individual evaluation plans (IEPs), whether a school is a charter school, 
teacher age, gender and years of experience, school level taught, whether teacher is fully 
certified, and whether the teacher is a new teacher (less than 3 years experience). In order 
to control for variation in state teacher labor markets, I also include state fixed effects in 
! 
Yik = aijk +D
"
ik+ Xk (AFT) + Xi(shortfield) + XijkB + Sstate + Ssurvey + eijk
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the model. In addition, to control for potential confounding factors associated with time 
specific changes in external labor market conditions between the first and last data 
collection periods, I include survey year fixed effects in the model.  
 
Causal Framework: Research Question 3 
Within three waves of the SASS, there are 106,930 teachers in a total of 6,540 
school districts.  Although many of these districts were only surveyed once in three 
survey administrations, 3,340, or slightly more than half, were surveyed more than once 
in different years.  Of these repeatedly surveyed districts, approximately one third 
provided shortage field incentives during at least one of the years they were surveyed. 
Some of these districts offered incentives in only one of the two or three years they were 
surveyed, while others offered them two of three survey years, and still others offered 
them every year they were surveyed. Henceforth, I will refer to these districts as multi-
year incentive districts. In the majority of multi-year incentive districts the shortage-field 
incentive policies were inconsistent across time.  Only 164 districts provided incentives 
during all the years they were surveyed, while 900 multi-year incentive districts offered 
shortage field incentives at least once, but less than every year they were surveyed.  
Exploiting the changes in shortage-field incentive policy over time, I propose a 
fixed effects strategy to investigate the impact of incentives on recruitment and retention 
outcomes.  By comparing changes in district outcomes in one time period to district 
outcomes in the same district, in another time period, this model allows me to make 
causal inferences about the viability of shortage-field incentives for improving the quality 
of teachers recruited into districts as well as the retention of teachers.  Because each 
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district essentially serves as its own counterfactual, the key assumption of this model is 
that the outcomes in a district over a given time period would be the same if a new 
incentive had not otherwise been added to district policy, or if a previously existing 
incentive had not been removed from district policy.  By comparing the level of change 
within districts over time, I can more precisely isolate the effect of the incentive policies 
on teacher outcomes.   
At the same time, because changes in policy are likely endogenous to the 
outcome, in the sense that districts that change incentive policies may do so because they 
are the districts most in need of creating change in either recruitment or retention 
conditions, I will also need to further isolate the effect to be able to examine the impact of 
incentive policy change within districts.  Therefore, in order to increase the robustness of 
my model, I will also examine the change in outcomes between shortage and non-
shortage field teachers in districts that report policy changes.  Outcomes for non-shortage 
field teachers should remain unaffected by changes in policy in shortage-field incentives 
and so this dimension improves the causal inference of the results.   
 
Analysis Sample: Research Question 3 
 In order to conduct these analyses, I utilize the full sample of teachers and 
districts that were surveyed more than once, in order to be able to make comparisons 
between districts with and without incentive changes over time.  This will give me a 
sample of 82,580 teachers in 3,340 districts, which represents more than half of all 
teachers surveyed by SASS in the three survey administrations.  Of these teachers, 36,110 
were in districts that offered surveys at least once during the multi-year period, with 
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20,300 of them surveyed the same year their district offered the incentive.  Of this 
sample, 254 districts, with 7,100 teachers, eliminated an incentive policy between the 
first and the second, or the second and third survey administration.  However, a total of 
540 districts, with 17,900 teachers added an incentive policy after not having one.  
Finally, 104 districts with 4,910 teachers either had an incentive, dropped it, and added it 
again, or added an incentive after not having one, and then dropped it again.  It is 
possible, however, that these districts represent measurement error, and will be dropped 
from the analysis sample.   
In addition, of the 1,064 multi-year incentive districts, a total of 210, with 1,630 
teachers, did not have any shortage field teachers who responded to the survey. These 
were removed from analysis, making the final sample 80,950 teachers.  In this final 
subset, there are a total of 18,590 shortage field teachers. 
Although this model examines the same teacher outcomes as the models proposed 
by research questions 1 and 2, by examining the issue over time, rather than cross-
sectionally, the analysis allows me to asses the way that recruitment and attrition 
dynamics respond to changes in policy within the same districts. In addition, by utilizing 
data from across all 50 states and the District of Columbia, these findings are more 
generalizable.  Furthermore, there is only minimal overlap between the analysis sample 
used in these models and the analysis sample used in the IV models, meaning that results 
of this analyses are not be derived from the same teachers.  
Once again, the SASS design weights were not utilized in this analysis.  In this 
case, although the sample is much larger, because of the way the weights were 
constructed, teachers who were surveyed from the same school and district, had different 
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probabilities for selection in different years of the survey.  At the same time, teachers 
sampled from the same school and district in the same year, have the same weights.  
Therefore, utilizing the weights as constructed by NCES would mean that comparable 
teachers within the same school and district would be given unequal weighting in the 
analysis.  Therefore, the inclusion of district, school, and teacher level controls, as well as 
state and survey year fixed effects provide balance for any potential residual over-
sampling effects of various characteristics created by the initial sampling design.  
 
Analytic Models: Research Question 3 
 For my fixed effects analyses, I estimated the following model for both the 




where Yik  represents the recruitment or retention of teacher i in district k;  X1 is an 
indicator variable for whether or not a given district offers shortage-field incentives. The 
X2 parameter represents and indicator for whether a teacher is a shortage-field teacher, 
and X3 is an interaction term, as well as the variable of interest, of whether or not being a 
shortage-field teacher in a district that provide incentives has an impact on the outcome 
Y.  Xij is a vector of school and teacher level covariates, which include means of student 
minority, ELL, IEP, and free and reduced price lunch enrollment, as well as school size, 
grade level, and if the school is a charter. Teacher covariates include teacher gender, if 
the teacher is a new teacher, fully certified, or holds BA in a STEM field.  The parameter 
D represents individual district fixed effects. Survey year fixed effects are indicated by S.   
! 
Yik = X1(incentive) + X2(sf ) + X3(incent * sf ) + Xij +Ddistrict + Ssurvey +" ik
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 I estimate versions of this model on a variety of different sub-samples.  For 
example, the first estimation only includes districts that actually reported a change in 
incentive policy between survey years.  Those that never offered an incentive policy, or 
those that reported offering incentives every year they were surveyed are not utilized in 














Policy Context: Setting the Stage 
Teaching Contract Document Analysis  
 In order to understand the empirical findings presented in the next chapter, I 
wanted to first set the stage for understanding the policy context in which the empirical 
data are located.  Because my identification strategy is predicated on the assumption of 
variation in teaching contracts, I begin by conducting a document analysis of a subsample 
of negotiated teacher contracts from districts that were identified in the SASS as offering 
shortage-field incentives.  This is followed by an analytic estimation of the magnitude of 
incentives offered to teachers in shortage fields.  
The document analysis helps to contextualize the policy environment within 
which shortage field incentives have been both negotiated and applied.  Unlike the 
theoretical assumption that all shortage-field teachers be paid salary differentials, my 
findings indicate that the actual implementation of incentive policy is much less clear, 
and potentially more arbitrary than the theoretical assumption of uniform differentials 
would suggest.    
In total, the analysis sample for the full empirical analysis includes 350 districts in 
18 states that offer a shortage-field incentive of some kind.  In order to understand 
exactly how these incentives were applied, I searched for publicly available negotiated 
teacher contracts for these districts.  In 3 states, (MI, NH, NJ) I have near complete 
teacher contract information for all districts in the state.  In an additional 6 states (IL, OH, 
IN, KS, PA, WI) I have found some, but not all, contracts available for shortage-field 
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incentive districts.  I was unable to locate any teacher contracts available in the remaining 
9 states in my sample (CA, CT, MA, MD, OK, OR, RI, TN, WA)5. 
In total, I reviewed the language on shortage-field incentives in 129 teacher labor 
contracts from districts that indicated they provide shortage-field incentives in the SASS.  
I then classified the type of language I found about shortage-field incentives in these 
contracts in the following manner:  
Strong: Any contract that listed a specific dollar amount to be paid to teachers in 
shortage-fields. Some examples of language classified as strong included: 
“Teachers with an ELL certification will be paid an additional 
$1,000 per year.”  
“Special ed teachers hired prior to August, 1977 get a $220 
differential”.  
“The District shall have the option of paying a one-time contract 
signing bonus to newly hired Speech Pathologists, Occupational 
Therapists, Physical Therapists, and other employees in areas 
defined by the Board in agreement with the Union President as 
chronic-certified and/or licensed shortages.  
Hard to Fill Bonus: 2009-2010=$2,454.17  
2010-2011=$2,454.17”   
 
The main criterion for the classification of a “strong” contract was that it discussed a 
specific dollar amount to be paid to teachers in specific fields.  Out of the 164 contracts I 
reviewed, 22 were classified as containing strong, specific language about incentive 
magnitude. 
Vague:  I classified a further 32 contracts as containing vague language about incentives 
or placement of teachers higher on the salary schedule as a recruiting tool.  This category 
was more varied. Some examples of contracts classified as vague include:  	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“Newly hired teachers who are in critical shortage areas and who 
are properly certificated may be placed up to four steps above the 
beginning salary step”   
 
"The board of education reserves the right to exceed the salary 
schedule to obtain the services of a teacher if it is for the good of 
the district".   
 
“For teachers recommended to fill positions of ‘critical 
shortages’, placement may be advanced up to two (2) steps 
beyond applicable teaching experience.” 
 
“Upon initial employment teachers for positions that are critical 
in need as designated by the [Name] County Superintendent of 
Schools may be placed up to step 11 in 2000-2001, step 12 in 
2001-2002, step 13 in 2002-2003, and step 14 in 2003-2004.” 
 
 
The main criteria for the “vague” classification was that there was enough language to 
explain the positive incentive reported in SASS, but which was otherwise unclear about 
whether or if specific teachers of specific subjects were actually paid differentials of any 
specific amount, at any point in time.  
 
No Language: Despite the positive reporting for district offered incentives in the SASS, I 
could find no language to indicate that incentives might be offered in 75 of the 164 (45 
percent) contracts I reviewed. 
 
No Contract Available: I was unable to find contracts for 35 of the districts in the 9 
states where I was able to locate some or all teacher contracts. 
The final column of Table 25 may potentially offer some explanation as to why so 
many of the teacher contracts in districts that reported offering incentives did not contain 
any language indicating any detail that would further illuminate the type of incentives 
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offered.  The SASS sample contains data from surveys beginning in the 1999-2000 
school year, and collected again in 2003-2004, and 2007-2008.  However, publicly 
available teacher contracts tend to be provided for that which was most recently 
negotiated. Many of the contracts I found were negotiated in 2008 or later. The final 
column of Table 11 provides an accounting of the number of districts that reported 
positive for incentive offerings, where I also have the corresponding negotiated contract 
for the same year.  In total, I have just 9 districts where the available contract matches the 
survey year in which the incentive was reported. 
Table 2 














NH (n=14) 3 7 4 0 1 
NJ (n=16) 5 5 4 2 3 
MI (n=24) 1 5 17 1 3 
IL (n=13) 2 0 10 1 1 
OH (n=18) 1 0 5 12 0 
IN (n=6) 0 0 5 1 0 
KS (n=26) 7 7 9 3 0 
PA (n=24) 3 2 12 7 1 
WI (n=23) 0 6 9 8 0 
Total (n=164) 22 32 75 35 9 	  
Summary	  
This document analysis provides greater context for which to understand the 
results of the empirical models, presented below.  For example, even for those contracts 
that contained language about incentives, the application of those incentives remains 
questionable.  This is because although the language gives district personnel freedom to 
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offer incentives, it does so in a manner vague enough to make it plausible that many 
shortage-field teachers hired into those districts were not actually offered incentives upon 
hire.  Furthermore, the conditions under which Human Resources staff may actually be 
authorized to make incentive offers to prospective hires is so vague, it seems unlikely that 
in many of these districts the availability of incentives are used as a recruitment tool, let 
alone as part of outreach efforts to populations of prospective teachers who may not 
otherwise consider a career in teaching.  
In essence, although theory predicts that a change in salary should serve to change 
the selection mechanism of those who consider teaching, in practice if salary increases 
are to function as a recruitment tool, then reasonably those who are currently deterred 
from teaching because of salary need to be given positive information that salary 
conditions have changed.  Thus, if a higher salary is used only as a tool for recruitment in 
a time of emergency, it is unlikely that it is applied as part of a concerted effort to change 
the pool of applicants, but rather is used only as a means to secure a specific candidate 





Incentive Magnitude Estimation 
In addition to the somewhat uncertain policy environment illuminated by the 
labor contracts described above, it is also important to motivate any discussion of 
financial incentives by framing it in terms of magnitude.  For example, when theorists 
discuss shortage field incentives as a tool for reducing opportunity costs, does this mean 
that incentives for shortage-field teachers should match the average differential between 
teaching and non-teaching options for teachers with STEM degrees?  Or is there some 
additional amount that will provide enough of a difference to reduce attrition to a more 
tolerable level?  Does the amount needed to make a difference in teacher outcomes differ 
by labor market context?   
Because the SASS does not contain information specifically about how much 
extra money was provided to shortage-field teachers in districts that offered shortage-
field incentives, I am unable to answer all of these questions.  However, utilizing the 
teacher annual salary data information provided in the survey, I am able to employ 
empirical models to estimate some trends, including how much more money shortage-
field teachers in districts that provide incentives earn, relative to other teachers, both 
across the full sample and in different regions of the country.  In addition, I can estimate 
how much more shortage-field teachers who taught in AFT affiliated districts earned the 
year they were surveyed. 
Thus, in order to try to understand the salary context in which shortage field 
incentives are offered, I first calculated simple means of teacher salaries across the full 
sample, and by region of the country. Across all regions, I find an average of $53,331.  
Salaries are slightly higher in the Northeast, where the average is $58,548.  The lowest 
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average is for teachers in the South, at $45,346. Mean salaries are $51,066 and $54,630 in 
the Midwest and West, respectively.      
I then conducted simple linear regression models (Table 3) in which teacher 
salary is the outcome variable6. These models reveal substantial variation in teacher 
salaries in different regions of the country.  In these OLS models, the variable of interest 
is the coefficient on the variable for shortage field teachers teaching in districts that offer 
shortage-field incentives. This coefficient provides an estimate of the size of the salary 
difference between shortage field teachers in districts that offer incentives and all other 
teachers in the sample, controlling for other characteristics.   
In these models, the effect of being a shortage-field teacher in a district that 
provides shortage-field incentives is negative, but non-significant in both the full analysis 
sample, and across regions of the county.  These findings suggest that, on average, 
shortage-field teachers teaching in districts that offer incentives receive lower salaries 
than other teachers, even when controlling for teacher experience, or being a new teacher.  
That said, none of the estimates are statistically significant, and the confidence intervals 
suggest that there is considerable variation in the amount of money teachers in these 
districts were paid. For example, in the full sample, the range for the differential is 
between earning $2,299 less than other teachers to earning $852 more than other 
teachers, annually.  In the Northeast, the earnings range for shortage-field incentives is 
estimated between $3,330 less to earning $3,031 more.  In the Midwest, the confidence 
interval ranges from $3,958 less to $1,577 more, and in the South the range is between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  All	  salary	  variables	  are	  CPI	  adjusted	  to	  2007	  dollars,	  which	  is	  the	  last	  and	  most	  recent	  year	  of	  the	  survey.	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$5,031 less to $4,228 more. Finally, the confidence interval in the West ranges between 
earning $2,327 less to earning $1,653 more.   
One possible explanation for this finding may be that districts that offer incentives 
are more likely to employ teachers with fewer credentials and years of experience 
generally, which are the main drivers of teacher salaries.   If this is the case, than districts 
that offer additional incentives may be paying shortage-field teachers more than they pay 
other teachers in their own districts, but still less than more experienced or better 
credentialed teachers receive elsewhere.  This is plausible because in both the Midwest 
and the Northeast, shortage-field teachers across all districts earn approximately $1,500 
more than other teachers, and the results are statistically significant (p<.01). Since these 
regions combined comprise more than half the analysis sample, the findings indicate that 
districts without formal shortage-field incentive policies are paying their shortage-field 
teachers more than other teachers, even when controlling for factors such as experience 
or being a new teacher.  
Moreover, in the South, districts that offer incentives pay all teacher in their 
districts an average of almost $1,900 (p<.05) less a year than other districts in that region,  
which suggests that because these models place all teachers together and do not 
adequately distinguish the selection bias between districts that do and do not offer 
incentives, the models are likely capturing the effects of the non-random characteristics 






Table 3   
OLS Salary Models, Full Sample and by Region 
 Full Sample Northeast Midwest South West 
Shortage Field 
Teacher*Incentive -731 -174 -1,236 -401 -290 
 (804) (1,618) (1,413) (2,338) (1024) 
District offers 
incentive -285 -413 -30 -1,882* -346 
 (450) (813) (862) (946) (730) 
Shortage field 
teacher 918** 1,574** 1,570** 2,199 737 
 (364) (582) (467) (1,568) (688) 
Constant 40,018** 41,270** 25,328** 51,603** 49,229** 
 (1,941) (3,020) (2,898) (4,918) (4,225) 
Observations 23,110 7,060 7,040 3,420 5,590 
R-squared 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.44 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving free/reduced price 
lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, middle and high school 
indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher indicator, survey year and state 
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level. All Salaries adjusted to 2007 levels. 
 
Thus, in order to attempt to gain a better understanding of the salary differentials 
paid to shortage field teachers in AFT affiliated districts, I also conducted an analysis in 
which I utilized the available salary information as the outcome in my first stage equation 




where I is the yearly income from teaching received by teacher i.  In this model, the 
coefficient on the interaction term is an estimate of how much more shortage-field 
teachers in AFT districts are earning than either other teachers in their district, or more 
than teachers in NEA districts. This is a more targeted analysis, and is likely to more 
specifically illuminate a salary dynamic that is specific to the model estimates discussed 
in the next chapter.    
! 
Ii = Zk (AFT * shortfield) + Xk (AFT) + Xi(shortfield) + XijkB + Sstate + Ssurvey + eijk
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 When I run this model on the salaries of all teachers, I find that, on average, 
shortage-field teachers in AFT districts earn only about $260 more a year than non-
shortage-field teachers (Table 4).  However, the result is not statistically significant, and 
the confidence interval for the estimate places the true value in a range between $860 less 
to $1,370 more.  This confidence interval may be indicative of a variety of 
implementation scenarios. It is possible that incentives are generally very small, that they 
are not large enough to overcome gaps between districts, or that many of the shortage-
field teachers in the sample who work in districts that report offering incentives likely did 
not actually receive them.   
 However, I also run this model again, by regions. I find that shortage field 
teachers teaching in AFT affiliated districts in the Northeast earn and average of $3,800 
more than non-shortage AFT field teachers, and that the result is statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level.  By contrast, shortage field teachers in the Midwest, earn an average of 
$2,222 less than other teachers. The result is also statistically significant at the 0.01 
percent level.   
I also find negative estimates in both the South and the West. However, these 
results are not statistically significant, and the confidence intervals are very large, 
particularly in the South, where the standard error is more than 3 times the size of the 
coefficient estimate.  In addition, while the sample sizes in the Northeast and Midwest 
regions are similar at approximately 7,000 teachers teaching in each of these regions, 
they are smaller in the West, and particularly the South, which likely contributes to the 
uncertainty of these estimates.   
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 Based on these findings, I also run a model in which I exclude only the 
Midwestern states, and I find that the average estimated salary for shortage-field teachers 
in AFT districts is $1,610 higher than for other teachers. This result is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level.  This finding suggests that outside of the Midwest, 
shortage field teachers teaching AFT districts are earning somewhat more than their 
counterparts in the NEA, as well as more than non-shortage field teachers.  In addition 
the average amount more they are earning is approximately the size of a single salary step 
in may districts, which is in line with the AFT policy of placing shortage field teachers 
higher on the salary scale. 
 In addition, the findings for these analyses suggest that the teacher labor markets 
and compensation in the Midwest is not comparable to labor markets in other regions of 
the country, and suggest that analyses on other teacher outcomes may be impacted by 
dynamics that differ across regions.  
   
Table 4   
First Stage Salary Models, Full Sample and by Region 
 
Full 





Field  256 3,828** -2,222** -719 -1,760 
 
1,607* 
 (569) (1094) (805) (2,234) (1,107) (780) 
Constant 37,583** 34,540** 16,938** 35,789** 45,918** 41,977** 
 (1,038) (1,959) (1,658) (2,667) (2,157) (1291) 
Observations 23,110 7,060 7,040 3,420 5,590 16,070 
R-squared 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.50 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving free/reduced 
price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, middle and high 
school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher indicator, survey year 






In this chapter, I set the stage for understanding the policy context in which 
shortage field incentives are implemented in two ways. First, I conducted a document 
review of a sub-sample of union negotiated contracts from districts that indicated they 
offered incentives.  These analyses suggest that the implementation of incentives may be 
limited to securing teachers who are already in the teacher labor market pool, for specific 
positions.  There is little evidence, however, that these incentives are utilized as 
marketing tools, or to expand the appeal of teaching to non-traditional candidates, which 
may undermine their ability to influence the selection mechanisms of potential teachers 
into the profession.  
Interestingly, in line with the type of policy endorsed by the AFT, the language of 
many of the contracts that do discuss incentives suggests placing shortage-field teachers 
on higher steps of the salary scale rather than providing specific dollar amounts, or 
otherwise deviating from the teacher compensation scheme.  In addition to language, the 
contracts also detail the size of the steps on the individual district salary schedules.  In 
many districts, a single step is typically worth somewhere between $1,000 and $1,500 
dollars, which is approximately the size of the average incentive magnitude estimated for 
the non-Midwestern regions, in my second analysis.  
In this step, in the absence of data about the size of shortage-field incentives, I 
utilized teacher salary data to estimate an average incentive magnitude.  I found evidence 
to suggest that teacher compensation is lower in the Midwest than in other regions of the 
country.  In addition, I found a potential difficulty for the viability of my identification 
strategy in the data from the Midwest. Namely, shortage-field teachers in AFT affiliated 
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districts in this region actually earn significantly less than other teachers, which suggests 
that I might also find differences in recruitment and retention outcomes in that region, 
using the models I proposed in Chapter 2.  Moreover, once I remove the Midwest from 
the pool for estimating the salary differential, I find that shortage field teachers teaching 
in AFT affiliated districts earn an average of $1,600 more than their non-shortage field 
counterparts.   This estimate supports the descriptive evidence found in the contract 
document review because this amount of money is also approximately the size of one 

























Descriptive Results: Research Questions 1 and 2 
Retention Outcomes 
Descriptive analyses comparing districts that do and do not offer incentives from 
the analytic sample show similar differences as were found between districts from the 
complete sample (Table 5).  Specifically, districts that offer incentives have higher 
proportions of Black and Hispanic students, more students eligible for the federal lunch 
program, and more ELL and IEP students.  They are also larger, and more likely to be 
urban. Interestingly, the mean salaries teachers receive are about $600 a year higher in 
districts that offer incentives.  Although this is a statistically significant difference, it is 
questionable whether such a difference, which amounts to about 50 pre-tax dollars a 
month, is a substantively meaningful difference in the lives of teachers. 
 
Table 5 
Charac t e r i s t i c s  o f  Dis t r i c t s  that  Do and Do Not Of f e r  Shor tage - f i e ld  Incen t iv e s  (Analy t i c  Sample )  
Variable Name 
(at district level) 
Shortage-field Incentives  
(n=310) 
No Shortage-field Incentives  
(n=1,690) 
District Mean % Black 0.23 0.11 
District Mean % Hispanic 0.19 0.11 
District Mean % in lunch program 0.45 0.34 
District Mean Enrollment 35,245 22,525 
District Mean Teacher Salary $50,046 $49,450 
District Mean % ELL Students 0.23 0.18 
District Mean % IEP Students 0.12 0.08 
Urban 0.46 0.26 
Suburban 0.41 0.55 
Rural 0.13 0.18 
South 0.17 0.14 
Midwest 0.27 0.32 
Northeast 0.28 0.30 
West 0.26 0.22 




Descriptive comparisons of teachers in districts represented by the AFT and the 
NEA show that 24 percent of AFT teachers teach in districts with incentives, compared to 
13 percent of NEA teachers (Table 6).  The statistics show that there are significant 
differences between the kinds of districts represents by the two unions. Those represented 
by the AFT have higher percentages of Black and Hispanic students, are larger, have 
more students eligible for free or reduced lunch, and are more likely to be urban.  
However, there are no significant differences between the numbers of ELL or IEP 
students in the districts represented by the two unions.  Mean salaries in AFT districts are 
also higher.  
Table 6 
Charac t e r i s t i c s  o f  Dis t r i c t s  Repres en t ed  by  the  AFT and the  NEA 
Variable Name 





Has Shortage-field incentives 0.24 0.13 
District Mean % Black 0.29 0.10 
District Mean % Hispanic 0.21 0.11 
District Mean % in lunch program 0.49 0.33 
District Mean Enrollment 73,299 14,791 
District Mean Teacher Salary $51,041 $49,243 
% ELL Students 0.19 0.19 
% IEP Students 0.09 0.08 
Urban 0.65 0.22 
Suburban 0.30 0.58 
Rural 0.05 0.20 
*T-test statistics. Mean differences all significant at the p<.001 level, except differences in district enrollment in ELL students, 
and students with IEPs which are not significant. 
Descriptive statistics also show differences between teachers who left their school 
after one year, and those who remained (Table 7).  Overall, 14 percent of the teachers in 
the analysis sample were not retained in their school after one year.  Those who left were 
more likely have taught in urban schools, and Southern schools, whereas in the Midwest 
	  	  
68	  
fewer teachers left teaching.  Leavers were also more likely to have taught in AFT 
affiliated districts.  Teachers more frequently left schools with higher proportions of 
Black students, but there was no difference in the average number of Hispanic students in 
the schools of teachers who were and were not retained. There was also little difference 
in the average rates of ELL students, or percentages of students with IEPs.  However, the 
schools teachers left had an average of 4 percent more of students eligible for 
free/reduced price lunch.  Shortage-field teachers were also somewhat more likely to 
leave their schools.  However, 46 percent of leavers were high school teachers, compared 
to 52 percent of those who remained, compared to elementary and middle school teachers 
who, combined, comprised 48 percent of those who left and 42 percent of those who 
stayed, indicating that high school teachers as a whole have higher retention rates than 
other teachers.  Fully certified teachers were also more likely to remain, as were teachers 
with a BA in a STEM field.  Male teachers comprised 32 percent of those who left, and 
34 percent of those who stayed, which is interesting in light of the teacher gender 
literature presented above, suggesting that males who select into teaching, are more likely 
to remain.  Finally, consistent with the literature, 24 percent of teachers who left their 










Charac t e r i s t i c s  o f  Teachers  Who Were  and Were  Not Reta ined  in  the i r  Schoo l  fo r  1  Year  
Variable Name 
(at teacher level) 




Total 0.14 0.86 
Shortage-field incentives 0.17 0.15 
City 0.31 0.29 
Rural 0.17 0.18 
South 0.17 0.14 
Northeast 0.30 0.31 
Midwest 0.31 0.33 
West 0.23 0.23 
AFT 0.19 0.16 
NEA 0.81 0.84 
Charter 0.02 0.01 
School % Black 0.17 0.13 
School % Hispanic 0.12 0.12 
School % IEP 0.22 0.21 
School % LEP 0.11 0.09 
School % free/reduced lunch 0.37 0.33 
New Teacher 0.24 0.14 
Shortage field 0.25 0.23 
Elementary 0.32 0.28 
Middle 0.16 0.14 
High School 0.46 0.52 
Combined grades 0.07 0.06 
Fully certified 0.82 0.89 
Female teacher 0.68 0.66 
Male teacher 0.32 0.34 
STEM BA 0.12 0.14 
T-test statistics. Mean differences significant at the p<.01 level. Mean difference not significant for rural, Northeast, Midwest, West, combined 
grades, or teacher gender.  
 
A little more than half of all the teachers who left their schools after one year, did 
not move to a new school, but rather chose to leave teaching.  Specifically, although 6 
percent of teachers moved to another school, 8 percent left the profession.  Descriptive 
statistics of the characteristics of the schools and teachers for this subgroup of leavers 
(Table 8), showed similar results to those found for the school retention outcome, 
suggesting that teachers in districts with shortage-field incentives are retained in teaching 





Charac t e r i s t i c s  o f  Teachers  who Were  and Were  not  Reta ined  in  the  Teach ing  Pro f e s s ion  for  1 Year  
Variable Name 
(at teacher level) 
Not Retained in Teaching 
(n=2,000) 
Retained in Teaching 
(n=24,230) 
Total 0.08 0.92 
Shortage-field incentives 0.17 0.15 
City 0.31 0.29 
Rural 0.16 0.18 
South 0.16 0.14 
Northeast 0.30 0.31 
Midwest 0.30 0.32 
West 0.23 0.23 
AFT 0.20 0.16 
NEA 0.80 0.84 
Charter 0.02 0.01 
School % Black 0.18 0.13 
School % Hispanic 0.12 0.12 
School percent IEP 0.22 0.21 
School % LEP 0.11 0.09 
School % free/reduced lunch 0.38 0.34 
New Teacher 0.18 0.15 
Shortage field 0.22 0.24 
Elementary 0.28 0.28 
Middle 0.16 0.14 
High School 0.50 0.52 
Combined grades 0.06 0.06 
Fully certified 0.83 0.88 
Female teacher 0.66 0.67 
Male teacher 0.34 0.33 
STEM BA 0.12 0.14 
T-test statistics. Mean difference significant at p<.01; Mean difference not significant for Northeast, Midwest, West, shortage field, elementary, 
high school, combined grades, gender, Stem BA.  
 
Recruitment Outcomes 
Unlike the descriptive evidence for the retention outcomes, the descriptive 
evidence for teacher academic background indicates that there is very little variation 
between teachers, at least as far as the competitiveness rankings of their undergraduate 
institutions.  Specifically, over 50 percent of teachers graduated from colleges clustered 






Distribution of Teachers by Barron’s Rank of Undergraduate Institution 
 
 
As such, there are almost no significant differences in the academic backgrounds of 
different categories of teachers (Table 9).  For example, the mean academic rank of 
teachers in districts that both do and do not offer shortage-field incentives is 3.3.  Notable 
exceptions to this trend are between new teachers, who have an average college rank of 
3.7, compared to more experienced teachers, who have an average rank of 3.2.  It is 
unclear from the data, however, if new teachers actually graduated from better colleges 
than their more experienced counterparts, or if these teachers benefit from coming of age 
in an era when colleges themselves have become more strategic about climbing the 
rankings ladder.  This phenomenon could impact this difference because two teachers 
who graduated from the same college 20 years apart, could have different rankings that 
are due either to actual academic improvement, or to a given college increasing its 
rankings by engaging in competitive ranking game play (Farrell & Van Der Werf, 2007).   
A 3.7 to 3.2 difference is also the difference between the college rank of teachers 







certified graduated from colleges with slightly lower academic rankings than teachers 
who are not fully certified, although this could reflect the same difference as the new 
teacher difference since new teachers are also more likely to be uncertified.  Likewise, 
charter school teachers also graduated from colleges with an average rank that is 0.02 
points higher than teachers in traditional public school, but charter school teachers also 
tend to be younger than other teachers.  Teachers in the Northeast graduated from higher 
ranked colleges than teachers in other regions.  Specifically, the Northeast average is 3.7, 
compared to 3.1, with Southern teachers graduating from colleges with the lowest 
academic rankings.  It is unclear from these data if the stronger academic backgrounds of 
Northeastern teachers is due to the clustering of competitive colleges in this region, or to 
other factors that attract graduates from these colleges to teach in this region. 
 
Table 9 
Characteristic of Teachers by Barron’s Rank of Undergraduate Institution 
Variable Name 
(Teacher Level) Variable=1 Variable=0 
District offers shortage-field incentives 3.3 3.3 
City 3.3 3.3 
Rural 3.0 3.4 
South 3.0 3.3 
Northeast 3.7 3.1 
Midwest 3.4 3.0 
West 3.3 3.3 
AFT 3.4 3.3 
Charter school teacher 3.5 3.3 
New teacher 3.7 3.2 
Shortage-field teacher 3.3 3.2 
Elementary 3.2 3.3 
Middle 3.3 3.3 
High School 3.4 3.2 
Fully certified 3.3 3.6 
Female teacher 3.3 3.3 
Has STEM BA 3.7 3.2 





Looking at descriptive statistics for the infield outcome, I compared only 
shortage-field teachers who were either teaching infield or out-of-field (Table 10), as 
opposed to comparing them to non-shortage field teachers.  For these analyses, infield 
was defined as a teacher who had a BA in any STEM field, in any special education field, 
or in bilingual or English language learner education, or in Spanish.  Teachers with BA 
degrees in other foreign languages, which included German, Latin, French, Russian or 
Other Foreign Language, were not counted as infield because only a very small fraction 
of them were teaching bilingual education, and the vast majority were assigned to teach 
foreign languages, or other subjects, like social studies.  Teachers with the 
aforementioned primary undergraduate majors were counted as infield teachers if their 
main teaching assignment included classes is math or science, special education, or 
bilingual education, respectively.  Teachers were considered out-of-field if their major 
field of assignment was other than the subject area that best corresponded to their major.  
Surprisingly, considerably more shortage-field teachers were teaching out-of-field than 
infield.  However, it appears that most of the out-of-field teaching was done by special 
education and bilingual teachers, given that 73 percent of shortage-field teachers who 
were teaching infield, also held a STEM BA, compared to just 1 percent of those teaching 
out-of-field.  This descriptive finding suggests that when schools can hire a teacher with 
the appropriate subject matter background, they are likely to assign them to the classes 
that best fit their skills.   
In addition, infield teachers taught in schools with slightly higher mean 
percentages of Black students, but also taught in schools with far fewer students eligible 
for free or reduced lunch, and lower mean percentages of Hispanic, IEP, and LEP 
	  	  
74	  
students.  These numbers however, may reflect the fact that infield teachers tend to teach 
in more wealthy schools, but they also may be less likely to be found in elementary 
schools, where students tend to have more IEPs, and where younger students with less 
exposure to English may be more likely to be classified as language learners than their 
secondary school counterparts.  Lower percentages of infield teachers are found in the 
Midwest and the Northeast, as compared to the percentages of out-of-field teachers 
teaching in these regions, and the opposite is true for infield and out-of-field teachers 
located in both the West and South.  
Table 10 







Total 0.30 0.70 
Shortage-field incentives 0.15 0.16 
City 0.39 0.30 
Rural 0.15 0.17 
South 0.18 0.13 
Northeast 0.28 0.32 
Midwest 0.29 0.33 
West 0.25 0.22 
AFT 0.20 0.18 
NEA 0.80 0.82 
Charter ~ 0.01 
School % Black 0.16 0.14 
School % Hispanic 0.10 0.12 
School percent IEP 0.14 0.23 
School % LEP 0.05 0.10 
School % free/reduced lunch 0.34 0.36 
New Teacher 0.15 0.15 
Elementary 0.11 0.24 
Middle 0.12 0.20 
High School 0.71 0.47 
Combined grades 0.06 0.09 
Fully certified 0.87 0.85 
Female teacher 0.58 0.69 
Male teacher 0.42 0.31 
STEM BA 0.73 0.01 




Overall the descriptive picture presented here serves to illustrate much of the 
literature that was presented in the last chapter.  Specifically, that teacher attrition 
disproportionately impacts urban schools that serve higher percentages of Black and 
Hispanic students, as well as those that serve higher proportions of English learners, and 
those students who live in poverty.  They also affirm the notion that new teachers in their 
first three years leave both their schools and the teaching profession at much higher rates 
than their more experienced peers.  In addition, teachers in schools with higher 
concentrations of low income and minority students are less likely to be the schools 
staffed by infield shortage-field subject teachers. They are also more likely to be 
affiliated with the AFT, and are more likely to offer shortage field incentives.   
The quality outcome indicator examining teacher’s undergraduate academic 
institution, was found to be less variable than all the other outcomes and variables of 
interest.  These findings suggest a uniformity in the quality of teachers.  However, 
although there is less variation, teachers are clustered at the lower end of scale, indicating 
an overall mediocre supply of teachers, at least as indicated by the types of institutions 






Empirical Results: RQ1 & RQ2 
Analytic Results: Retention in School 
 The analytic models used to address the first research question utilize a total 
sample of just over 23,000 teachers, which represents a drop of 11 percentage points from 
the full analysis sample utilized for the descriptive findings, and is due to the automatic 
listwise deletion of observations with missing data on any variables.  Data were complete 
for almost all control variables, except the school reported percentages of ELL students, 
and students eligible for the federal lunch program.  Although it is possible that these 
missing values could bias results, utilizing data available through the Common Core of 
Data (CCD), I spot checked a random sample of schools that were missing the lunch 
variable and found that schools that were missing this information were fairly evenly split 
between those with high percentages of lunch eligible students and those with zero lunch 
eligible students.  A small minority of schools from this random sample were not listed in 
the CCD, indicating that the school may no longer be in existence.  I was unable to check 
data on the percentage of ELL students at schools missing that information. 
Results from the first set of IV regressions for the school retention outcome 
suggest that shortage-field teachers in AFT districts are significantly more likely to teach 
in districts that provide incentives (Table 11).  Specifically, in the first stage, shortage-
field teachers in AFT teachers are 17 percent more likely (p<.01) to teach in districts with 
incentives than are shortage-field teachers in NEA districts, suggesting that the 
interaction of AFT and shortage-field is a strong instrument for use in these models.  In 
addition, the first stage F-statistic of joint significance for this model is 29.4, which 




In the second stage, however, I find that shortage-field incentives are not 
statistically significantly related to school retention.  In this model, the coefficient of 
0.122 is estimated between -0.09 and 0.33 indicating that the true value for retention is 
likely positive, but that these data are too noisy to obtain a statistically significant result.   
Table 11   
Retent ion- in - s choo l  Outcome,  Ful l  Sample  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.122 
   (0.105) 
AFT*Shortfield 0.021 0.171**  
 (0.018) (0.014)  
AFT -0.012 -0.010** -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) 
Shortage-field -0.022** 0.122** -0.037* 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.017) 
Constant 0.721** -0.053** 0.7601** 
 (0.045) (0.014) (0.043) 
Observations 23110 23110 23110 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 
indicator, survey year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clusters at the district level. 
 
One of the concerns about this model is that the SASS does not contain very 
much information about the external factors that may influence teacher retention 
decisions.  Teacher labor markets tend to be local, but there is no direct evidence in the 
survey data about external job market factors, such as prevalence of other kinds of local 
industries, or average local wages.  Although the use of state level fixed effects does 
control for differences between states, it does so by holding constant the state level 
variation in things like local labor markets, and industries.  However, these fixed effects 
may not be enough to account for larger demographic trends in given areas because they 
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do not account for region level phenomena that cross state borders and impact large 
segments of the labor force.   
For example, an earlier descriptive study that analyzed SASS 1999-2000 data 
found that administrators across the Midwest reported fewer difficulties filling vacancies 
than did administrators in other parts of the country (Murphy et al., 2003). Specifically, 
that study looked at late fill vacancy rates7 for teaching positions and found that the 
average in many states in the Midwest, including 4 of the 5 from that region that remain 
in my analysis sample, was less than 1 percent, which was the lowest possible rating. In 
contrast, the national average late fill vacancy rate was 1.5 percent, while the rate in 
many Western states was more than 2 percent, and in some cases as high as 5 percent.  
Although these do not seem like large differences, the result is extremely consequential in 
terms of volume of teachers that must be hired and retained in the different regions.  By 
way of comparison, according to the Murphy paper, California employed a total of 
300,000 teachers and had a late-fill rate of 2.3 percent, which meant that that state hired 
6,900 teachers after the start of the school year.  By contrast, collectively Illinois, 
Michigan, and Ohio, employed 350,000 teachers, and had late-fill rates of 1.5 percent, 0.8 
percent, and 0.5 percent respectively.  Together, these states hired a total of 3,500 
teachers after the start of the school year, which is just half the number that had to be 
hired in California, despite a three state teacher population that is 17 percent larger.    
In addition, descriptive results from Table 7 above echo this trend and show that 
slightly more teachers from the Midwest are retained in their schools, than are teachers 
from other regions of the country.  In addition, data from the American Community 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Late	  fill	  rates	  are	  the	  percent	  of	  teaching	  positions	  that	  remained	  unfilled	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  school	  year.	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Survey8 suggest that workers in the public education sector in the Midwest comprise a 
smaller average proportion of the overall workforce than in other states. Specifically, 
calculations conducted by the author using ACS data found that the five Midwestern 
states in the analysis sample had an average public education sector workforce that 
represented 6.7 percent of all workers, while the rest of the states in the analysis sample 
had an average public education workforce of 7.5 percent of the total, suggesting possible 
overall lower demand for teachers in these states. Additionally, descriptive analysis 
provided above indicated that Midwestern teachers were less likely to either teach in 
districts that offered shortage-field incentives or leave their schools after one year.  
Although these findings are all descriptive in nature, they nevertheless suggest that 
teacher shortages are a localized phenomena, and specifically that teacher recruitment is 
less of a problem in the Midwest than in other parts of the country. They also illustrate 
why state fixed effects may be inadequate for controlling for the regional variation in 
teacher hiring trends. Finally, the salary analysis in the previous chapter indicates that 
both general teacher salaries, and salaries for shortage-field teachers in AFT affiliated 
districts in the Midwest are lower than elsewhere. Therefore, I re-ran the analysis 
excluding teachers and districts in states located in the Midwest.   
This sub-analysis reduces my sample to 16,000.  At the same time, removing this 
region (Table 12) increases the predicted likelihood in the first stage that shortage-field 
teachers in AFT districts will teach in districts that offer incentives to 25 percent (p<.01).  
Additionally, the instrument in this model remains strong, despite the reduction in sample 
size (F=26.4).  The estimated impact on retention also increases from 10.5 to almost 18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Data	  from	  the	  2010	  American	  Community	  Survey,	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau.	  Table	  title	  “Industry	  by	  Class	  of	  Worker	  for	  the	  Civilian	  Employed	  Population	  16	  Years	  and	  Over”,	  by	  state.	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percent (p<.05) and is also now statistically significant, indicating that shortage-field 
incentives have a positive impact on school retention in regions that face greater  
recruitment challenges.   
 
Thus far, all models have grouped all shortage-field teachers together, such that 
special education and bilingual teachers have been defined in the same group as math and 
science teachers.  However, it is reasonable to assume that teachers in these different 
fields face different labor market conditions.  Therefore, in order to determine whether 
the effect holds for different kinds of shortage-field teachers, I also conduct subgroup 
analyses for just math and science teachers, as well as for special education teachers and 
bilingual teachers.  In order to operationalize these models, and not loose further sample 
size, I replaced the shortage-field variable in the models with indicators specifically for 
Table 12  
Retent ion- in - s choo l  Outcome,  Non-Midwes t  Sample  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.178* 
   (0.074) 
AFT*Shortfield 0.045* 0.251**  
 (0.021) (0.019)  
AFT -0.022 -0.021** -0.018 
 (0.015) (0.002) (0.015) 
Shortage-field -0.019* 0.116** -0.040* 
 (0.009) (0.006) -0.015 
Constant 0.768** -0.078** 0.782** 
 (0.054) (0.019) (0.054) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving free/reduced price 
lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, middle and high school 
indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher indicator, survey year and state 
fixed effects. Standard errors clusters at the district level. 
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STEM teachers, and special education and bilingual teachers, such that the excluded 
instrument becomes an interaction between AFT, and these new indicator variables.  The 
control variables were also replaced with these new indicators, such that the first stages 






where STEM indicates a teacher of math or science, and SEB indicates a teachers of 
special education, or bilingual education. 
In the model that included math and science teachers alone the instrument 
remained strong (F=12.3), but the likelihood that these teachers would teach in districts 
offering incentives dropped to 19 percent (p<.01) in the non-Midwestern sample (Table 
13).  The estimated coefficient of on the incentive variable remained at about 18 percent, 
however in this specification it is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
One likely explanation for this drop in significance is sample size.  In particular, out of 
more than 16,000 teachers in non-Midwestern regions only 360 teachers actually taught 






Dik = Zk (AFT * STEM) + Xk (AFT) + Xi(STEM) + XijkB + Sstate + Ssurvey + eijk
! 





By contrast, the results for the special education and bilingual sample alone 
(Table 14), suggest that these teachers are 30 percent (p<.001) more likely to teach in 
districts offering incentives, and the instrument also remains strong is this model 
(F=14.5).  However, despite the increase in likelihood of a incentive, the estimate for 
retention suggest that these teachers are only 15 percent (p<.10) more likely to remain in 
their school after 1 year than comparable teachers who did not teach in districts providing 
incentives.  These findings suggest that despite the fact that shortage-field incentives are 
more likely to be offered to teachers of special and bilingual education, they may be 
slightly more effective for actually impacting retention of teachers of math and science.  
This may be related to the distinction discussed above between shortages driven by high 
Table 13 
Reten t ion- in - s choo l  ou t come,  STEM Teachers  in  Non-Midwes t e rn  Reg ions  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.182~ 
   (0.113) 
AFT*STEM 0.035 0.190**  
 (0.022) (0.026)  
AFT -0.015 -0.009** -0.014 
 (0.016) (0.002) (0.016) 
Stem teacher -0.009 0.112** -0.030 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.019) 
Constant 0.763** -0.039** 0.770** 
 (0.055) (0.014) (0.055) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
~ significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 
indicator, survey year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clusters at the district level. 
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turn-over and opportunity costs, and shortages driven by lack of supply.  It may be that 
more districts offer incentives for special education and bilingual teachers because more 
districts have difficultly finding teachers with these credentials in the recruitment phase.  
Table 14 
Retent ion  in  Schoo l ,  Spec ia l  Educat ion and Bi l ingua l  Teachers  in  Non-Midwes t e rn  Reg ions  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.150~ 
   (0.091) 
AFT*Special ed and Bilingual 0.046 0.306**  
 (0.031) (0.027)  
AFT -0.016 -0.011** -0.014 
 (0.015) (0.002) (0.014) 
Special ed and Bilingual -0.030* 0.113** -0.047* 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.023) 
Constant 0.763** -0.036** 0.748** 
 (0.054) (0.027) (0.054) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
~significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving free/reduced price 
lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, middle and high school 
indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher indicator, survey year and state 
fixed effects. Standard errors clusters at the district level. 
 
Finally, because of substantial evidence suggesting that new teachers in particular 
leave the profession at disproportionately high rates (Darling-Hammond, 2004; Ingersoll, 
1999), I also conducted the analysis specifically for new shortage-field teachers (those 
with 3 years or less of experience) in the non-Midwestern sample.  In this model, also to 
maintain sample size while restricting the analysis to the subsample of interest, I again 
replaced the original shortage-field teaching indicator with an indicator specifically for 
new shortage-field teachers, such that the first stage of the model is now specified as 
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Where the instrument is a triple interaction between AFT, New Teacher, and 
Shortage Filed.  However, the first stage F-statistic in this model drops to 4.34, and fails 
the weak instrument test.  This problem likely occurs because in the non-Midwestern 
sample, there were only 160 new shortage-field teachers who taught in AFT affiliated 
districts.  Because of these findings, the findings for the model, presented in Table 15 
should be considered merely illustrative, and be interpreted with caution.    
That said, in this model I found that new shortage-field teachers in AFT districts 
have a predicted likelihood of teaching in a district offering a shortage-field incentive of 
25 percent (p<.01), but that these incentives do not have a statistically significant impact 
on the retention of new teachers.  Although the coefficient is estimated at 0.23, the 
confidence interval is very large, ranging from an impact on retention estimated at 
between negative -0.45, to positive +0.92.  This finding suggests wide variation in the 
predicted impact of incentives on new shortage field teachers, as well as an inability to 







Table 15   
Retent ion in School  Outcome, New Teachers in Non-Midwestern Regions  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.233 
   (0.341) 
AFT*New Shortfield 0.059 0.254**  
 (0.087) (0.051)  
AFT -0.018 -0.001 -0.018 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.015) 
AFT*Shortfield 0.035 0.001 0.035 
 (0.021) (0.004) (0.021) 
AFT*New -0.025 0.0002 -0.025 
 (0.047) (0.001) (0.047) 
New Shortage-field -0.043 0.127** -0.076 
 (0.034) (0.015) (0.064) 
Constant 0.767** -0.028* 0.771** 
 (0.054) (0.007) (0.055) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 
indicator, survey year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clusters at the district level. 
 
 To verify that the effect is driven by more experienced teachers, I also analyzed 
the sample of teachers who have more than three years of experience in the non-
Midwestern region (Table 16). I again changed the interaction term in the model to 
reflect the different sample of interest: 




  In contrast to the results found for the new teachers, in the first stage the F-statistic is 
strong (21.3), and these teachers are also predicted to have a 25 percent greater chance of 
teaching in a district that offers incentives (p<.01).  However, in the second stage, I do 
not have a significant result.  Although the coefficient estimate is negative the confidence 
interval is very large, ranging from -0.90 to 0.43.  This range suggests that the data in the 
model are simply too noisy to detect an effect.  Moreover, the lack of significant findings 
for both the new and experienced teacher estimates suggest that the positive results above 
are driven by a combination of experience levels that cannot be parsed from the available 
sample.   
Table 16   
Retent ion  in  Schoo l  Outcome,  Exper i enced  Teachers  in  Non-Midwes t e rn  Reg ions  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   -0.238 
   (0.333) 
AFT*Exp Shortfield -0.059 0.248**  
 (0.087) (0.021)  
AFT -0.043 -0.023** -0.048 
 (0.045) (0.003) (0.051) 
AFT*Shortfield 0.095 0.001 0.095 
 (0.085) (0.003) (0.084) 
AFT*Experienced 0.025 0.004* 0.026 
 (0.047) (0.002) (0.048) 
Experienced Shortage-field 0.043 0.112** 0.069 
 (0.034) (0.006) (0.059) 
Constant 0.767** -0.049** 0.755** 
 (0.054) (0.017) (0.057) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
~ significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 




Analytic Results: Retention in Teaching 
 Results for the retained in teaching outcome were not statistically significant for 
any model specification.  Although these models were specified using a larger sample of 
retained teachers, the retention outcome allowed for more variation than the previous 
models.  The range of potential outcomes for teachers was expanded to include teachers 
who moved to another school in the same district, to a different school in another district, 
to a charter, or to a private school.  At the same time, the alternative category- the 
leavers- was compressed to include only those who left teaching for other careers, for 
family obligations, for retirement, or who died. 
 As expected, in the first set of analyses for the retained in teaching outcome, 
utilizing the full sample (Table 17), the first stage results are identical to the model 
above, in which a shortage-field teacher teaching in an AFT affiliated district has an 
almost 17 percent (p<.01) greater likelihood of being offered an incentive than 
comparable teachers.  However, the results in the second stage are not statistically 
significant.  In addition, the coefficient on the incentive variable is negative, close to 
zero, and has a wide confidence interval.  These findings suggests that, in this sample, 
shortage-field incentives may be less effective for teachers who are contemplating non-
teaching options, in comparison to teachers who may want to stay in teaching, but who 
without and incentive would otherwise would look for a different teaching position, 






Table 17  
Retent ion in Teaching Outcome, Ful l  Sample  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   -0.006 
   (0.100) 
AFT*Shortfield -0.001 0.172**  
 (0.017) (0.014)  
AFT -0.012 -0.010** -0.012 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) 
Shortage-field 0.006 0.122** 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) 
Constant 0.900** -0.053** 0.899** 
 (0.037) (0.014) (0.037) 
Observations 23,110 23,110 23,110 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 
indicator, survey year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level. 
 
 The result for the non-teaching outcome in the sample that does not include the 
Midwest region is also not statistically significant (Table 18).  In this sample, again the 
first stage results are identical to those presented above.  In this case, however, the 
coefficient on the variable of interest is positive, and the confidence interval is smaller 
than the estimate for the full sample, indicating that the elimination of the Midwest 
region does produce a better specified outcome.  However, the result nevertheless 
suggests that shortage-field incentives, at least in the magnitudes the have been applied in 
to the teachers in this sample, are still unlikely to impact the decisions of those 





Table 18  
Retent ion in Teaching Outcome, Non-Midwest  Sample  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.037 
   (0.061) 
AFT*Shortfield 0.009 0.251**  
 (0.015) (0.019)  
AFT -0.013 -0.021** -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) 
Shortage-field 0.008 0.116** 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 
Constant 0.879** -0.078** 0.894** 
 (0.048) (0.021) (0.048) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 
indicator, survey year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clusters at the district level. 
 
 The impact of shortage-field incentives on the retained-in-teaching outcome is 
also statistically indistinguishable from zero in the models that are specified separately 
for both math and science teachers, and teachers of special education and bilingual 
teachers. However, in the model for math and science teachers the coefficient on the 
incentive variable in the second stage is similar in size to the result estimated for the 
retained in school outcome, but is not significant. By contract, the coefficient of interest 
in the model for special education and bilingual teachers (Table 20) is both much smaller 
than the previous model, and negative.  The finding for STEM teachers helps confirm 
that these are the teachers whose retention behavior may be most impacted by the 
offering of shortage-field incentives, but the sample used in the retained in teaching 




Table 19  
Retent ion in Teaching Outcome, STEM Teachers in Non-Midwestern Regions  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.162 
   (0.112) 
AFT*Stem 0.031 0.190**  
 (0.016) (0.026)  
AFT -0.015 -0.009** -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) 
Stem teacher 0.007 0.116** -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) 
Constant 0.891** -0.039** 0.897** 
 (0.048) (0.014) (0.048) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 
indicator, survey year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clusters at the district level. 
 
Table 20 
Retent ion in Teaching,  Spec ia l  Educat ion and Bi l ingual Teachers in Non-
Midwestern Regions  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   -0.047 
   (0.077) 
AFT*Special ed. Bilingual 0.014 0.306**  
 (0.021) (0.028)  
AFT -0.009 -0.012** -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) 
Special ed. Bilingual 0.008 0.113** 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) 
Constant 0.891** -0.037** 0.890** 
 (0.048) (0.012) (0.048) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 




The results for the retained-in-teaching outcome are also not statistically 
significant for models that are specified separately for new teacher and experienced 
teachers (Tables 21 and 22).  The model for new teachers here also suffers from the same 
weak instrument problem discussed in the model that utilized the retained-in-school 
outcome, and should also be interpreted with caution.  The coefficient for the incentive 
treatment for experienced teachers is positive, but also statistically indistinguishable from 
zero.  
Table 21  
Retent ion in Teaching Outcome, Non-Midwest  Sample ,  New Teachers  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   -0.100 
   (0.276) 
AFT*New Shortfield -0.025 0.254**  
 (0.067) (0.052)  
AFT -0.008 -0.001** -0.008 
 (0.011) (0.0009) (0.011) 
AFT*Shortfield 0.012 0.0007 0.012 
 (0.014) (0.0004) (0.014) 
AFT*New --0.030 0.0002 -0.030 
 (0.036) (0.0007) (0.036) 
New Shortage-field 0.006 0.127** 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.044) 
Constant 0.891** -0.028** 0.887** 
 (0.048) (0.007) (0.049) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 








Retent ion in Teaching Outcome, Non-Midwest  Sample ,  Experienced Teachers  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.102 
   (0.285) 
AFT*Experienced Shortfield 0.025 0.248**  
 (0.067) (0.021)  
AFT -0.038 -0.023** -0.035 
 (0.035) (0.003) (0.039) 
AFT*Shortfield -0.013 0.001 -0.013 
 (0.066) (0.004) (0.066) 
AFT*Experienced Teacher 0.030 0.004* 0.029 
 (0.036) (0.002) (0.037) 
Experienced Shortage-field -0.006 0.112** -0.017 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.041) 
Constant 0.891** -0.049** 0.895** 
 (0.048) (0.017) (0.049) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 






Analytic Results: Recruitment 
My next set of analyses examines two teacher quality outcomes, including the 
Barron’s college plus ranking index, where each 1-unit increase represents a move up the 
Barron’s ranking scale from non-competitive to most competitive, as well as a 
dichotomous outcome indicating whether or not a teacher has an infield BA.  Although 
the first stage of this model should be identical to the results above, the sample size for 
these models is reduced by about 2,000 teachers for whom there is missing data on 
undergraduate institution.  Therefore, in the first stage of this model, using the full 
sample of data (Table 23), the shortage-field teachers in AFT districts have a 15 percent 
greater likelihood (p<.05) of teaching in a district that provides shortage-field incentives. 
In addition, I do not find any statistically significant impacts of incentives on the 
academic quality of teachers recruited.   
Table 23: 
Barron ’s  Index Outcome,  Ful l  Sample  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.121 
   (0.607) 
AFT*Shortfield 0.019 0.155*  
 (0.093) (0.015)  
AFT 0.036 -0.011** 0.037 
 (0.059) (0.009) (0.056) 
Shortage-field -0.128** 0.124 -0.143 
 (0.031) (0.005) (0.092) 
Constant 4.69** -0.065* 4.69** 
 (0.183) (0.016) (0.185) 
Observations 20,300 20,300 20,300 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 




Once I focus the sample to include only the non-Midwestern states (Table 24) that 
face significant recruitment challenges, the likelihood of shortage-field teachers teaching 
in AFT districts that provide incentives increases to 22 percent (p<.01).  However, the 
impact of incentives on quality of teachers recruited remains insignificant in this reduced 
sample.  Furthermore, in both models, the confidence interval on the coefficient of 
interest ranges from -0.96 to +1.2 in the full model, with a similar spread in the non-
Midwestern sample.  These results may be due to the fact that in both the full and non-
Midwestern samples, there is a lack of variation in teacher undergraduate rankings.  In 
both samples, 52 percent of all teachers attended a college with a “competitive” ranking, 
which is the 7th ranking out of nine, and coded as 3 in the variable rank.  Also in both 
samples, 18 percent of teachers attended colleges with the second from lowest “less 
competitive” ranking.  Sixteen percent of teachers attended colleges with “very 
competitive” rankings, which is the 5th ranking.  Finally, 6 percent of teachers attended 
the lowest ranked colleges, while 7 percent attended colleges with the top 4 rankings 
combined.  These figures hold for the samples of both shortage and non-shortage-field 
teachers. This lack of variation in the college ranking of teachers throughout the sample, 
makes it much less likely that shortage-field incentives can be identified as increasing the 
quality of teachers recruited into teaching. It also suggests that the issue of teacher quality 
and the teacher preparation pipeline may be a larger systemic issue that may need to be 







Since quality of undergraduate institution is an arguably distal measure of teacher 
quality, I also test whether districts that offer shortage-field incentives are more likely to 
recruit teachers with a BA in the subject they are teaching.  Although I again find no 
statistically significant impacts of incentives on this measure of teacher quality (Table 
23), it is interesting to note that the confidence interval on the coefficient of interest is 
much larger in the model that uses the non-Midwestern sample (Table 24) than in the full 
sample.  In the non-Midwest sample, the range is from -0.23 to + 0.22, but in the full 
sample to range is from -0.092 to +0.604.  Since the interval decreases when the sample 
size decreases, these differences suggest that when the Midwest is included, the overall 
likelihood that a teacher is infield is greater than in other parts of the country, lending 
further evidence to the idea that teacher labor markets in that part of the country are 
Table 24  
Barron ’s  Rank Outcome,  Non-Midwes t e rn  Sample  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.229 
   (0.592) 
AFT*Shortfield 0.051 0.219**  
 (0.125) (0.019)  
AFT 0.104 -0.021** 0.108 
 (0.077) (0.003) (0.073) 
Shortage-field -0.134** 0.118** -0.161 
 (0.039) (0.006) (0.092) 
Constant 4.69** -0.097** 4.72** 
 (0.229) (0.021) (0.235) 
Observations 14,100 14,100 14,100 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 
indicator, survey year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clusters at the district level. 
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different than in other regions.  Moreover, the regional disparities may help explain why 
the results for the retention in school outcomes in my first research question do not hold 
when those states are included in the model. Specifically, it is possible that teachers with 
undergraduate degrees in STEM fields may have fewer other employment options in the 
Midwest and are therefore more likely to be found in teaching there than elsewhere, even 







Table 25:  
In- f i e ld Teacher Outcome,  Ful l  Sample  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   0.257 
   (0.177) 
AFT*Shortfield 0.044 0.172**  
 (0.026) (0.014)  
AFT -0.015* -0.010* -0.012 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) 
Shortage-field 0.242** 0.122** 0.211 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.026) 
Constant 0.095** -0.053 0.108** 
 (0.027) (0.015) (0.030) 
Observations 23,100 23,100 23,100 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 






The lack of significant findings for the academic background outcome, combined 
with the lack of significant findings about in-field status, particularly in the non-
Midwestern states, suggests that although shortage-field incentives may be effective for 
stemming attrition of teachers who have already selected into the field, they may be 
ineffective, at least as they are currently administered, for enticing those who are not 
already predisposed to teaching, or those who have alternative options, to consider 
entering the field.  
In this chapter, I conducted analyses examining the impacts of shortage-field 
incentives on the retention and recruitment of teachers.  I utilized an instrumental 
variables, difference-in-differences approach and found that shortage field incentives 
Table 26  
Inf i e ld Outcome, Non-Midwestern Sample  
 Reduced Form 1st stage 2nd stage 
Shortage-field Incentive   -0.007 
   (0.115) 
AFT*Shortfield 0.002 0.251**  
 (0.029) (0.019)  
AFT -0.007 -0.021** -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Shortage-field 0.252** 0.116** 0.252** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.019) 
Constant 0.077* -0.079 0.077* 
 (0.035) (0.019) (0.037) 
Observations 16,070 16,070 16,070 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Control variables included in the model: city and rural indicators, school percent Black and Hispanic, school percent receiving 
free/reduced price lunch, school percent ELL and IEP, school enrollment (logged), charter school indicator, total teaching experience, 
middle and high school indicators, new teacher indicators, teacher age, teacher gender, teacher has a STEM BA, fully certified teacher 
indicator, survey year and state fixed effects. Standard errors clusters at the district level. 
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increase the probability that a teacher will remain in their school after 1 years by 
approximately 17 percent, in all states that require collective bargaining, except those 
located in the Midwest.  I also found that incentives were more effective for increasing 
the retention of more experienced teachers, but had little impact on attrition of those with 
less than 3 years of teaching experience.  The findings for new teachers however, may 
have been impacted by sample size issues. 
I also failed to find an impact of incentives on changes in the quality of teachers 
teaching in districts that offered shortage-field incentives. Specifically, shortage field 
teachers in incentive districts had similar academic backgrounds to their counterparts in 
districts that did not offer incentives, and were also as likely to be teaching infield.  Lack 
of variation in academic backgrounds of all teachers likely undermined the ability to 





















 Because the analysis sample changes from just over 26,000 teachers in research 
questions one and two, to almost 81,000 teachers in research question three, I also present 
descriptive results for the expanded sample utilized in the fixed effects analysis.  
 Table 26 provides characteristics of teachers and schools in districts, by the 
frequency of the incentive availability.  Largely, these findings indicate that the 
frequency with which a district provides incentives is likely endogenous to other district 
characteristics that are known to be associated with teacher shortages.  In particular, the 
more frequently a district offers shortage-field incentives, the more likely it is to be 
urban, and the less likely to be rural.  Districts in the South and West are also more likely 
to provide incentives on a more frequent basis, while the Midwest is less likely to provide 
incentives with each wave of the survey.  Districts that more frequently offer incentives 
also have higher mean percentages of Black and Hispanic students, as well as more 
language minority students. Districts that provide incentives also more frequently have 
lower average rates of certified teachers.  However, mean rates of teachers with 
bachelor’s degrees in math and science subjects remains relatively static, regardless of 
how frequently a district offers shortage-field incentives.  Finally, although teachers’ 
unions have often been cited as an impediment to shortage-field incentive 
implementation, the results for collective bargaining are mixed.  For example, the 
percentage of districts with collectively bargained contracts that never offer incentives, 
and those that offered it at least once are virtually the same.  However, more than half the 
districts that offered incentives twice also had collectively bargained contracts.  At the 
same time, only 30 percent of districts that provided the incentives every year had 
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collective bargaining.  These results suggest that there may be more variation in the 
flexibility of local union contracts than has been previously suggested. 
Table 27 












Incentive offered three 
times 
(n=60) 
Total 0.56 0.26 0.13 0.05 
City 0.21 0.30 0.43 0.46 
Rural 0.37 0.26 0.14 0.13 
South 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.43 
Northeast 0.14 0.07 0.10 NA 
Midwest 0.27 0.18 0.07 0.06 
West 0.22 0.32 0.42 0.52 
Collective 
bargaining 0.47 0.46 0.52 0.31 
Charter  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 
% Black 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.20 
% Hispanic 0.07 0.12 0.23 0.34 
% IEP 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.12 
% LEP 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.16 
% Lunch eligible 0.38 0.40 0.50 0.53 
Elementary 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.32 
Middle 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 
High school 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.49 
Combined grade 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.05 
New teacher 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.19 
Shortage teacher 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.22 
Fully certified 0.90 0.88 0.84 0.84 
Female 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Male 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Stem BA 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 
 
 I also examined comparisons between shortage and non-shortage field teachers in 
the fixed effects analysis sample (Table 27).  These descriptive findings suggest that 
these teachers teach in similar school settings.  There is little difference in the socio-
economic characteristics between the students taught by shortage and non-shortage field 
teachers, although shortage-field teachers as a whole are slight more likely to teach in 
urban areas, and slightly less likely to teach in the West.  Shortage-field teachers are also 
less likely to teach in elementary school, and more likely to teach in high school.  In 
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addition, these teachers are more likely to be represented by collective bargaining units, 
and slightly more likely to be male.  Shortage-field teachers are also less likely to be fully 
certified, which is unsurprising since districts are presumably more likely to hire an 
uncertified teacher in a field where there is a shortage.   
Table 28 





Non Shortage Field 
(n=62,360) 
Total 0.23 0.77 
City 0.30 0.27 
Rural 0.29 0.30 
South 0.39 0.39 
Northeast 0.12 0.11 
Midwest 0.22 0.21 
West 0.27 0.29 
Collective bargaining 0.50 0.46 
Charter  0.01 0.01 
% Black 0.16 0.16 
% Hispanic 0.12 0.11 
% IEP 0.15 0.14 
% LEP 0.06 0.06 
% Lunch eligible 0.41 0.41 
New teacher 0.16 0.16 
Elementary 0.21 0.30 
Middle 0.17 0.13 
High school 0.52 0.49 
Combined grade 0.10 0.08 
Fully certified 0.86 0.89 
Female 0.67 0.69 
Male 0.33 0.31 
Stem BA 0.18 0.11 
Mean differences significant at p<.01. Mean differences not significant for rural, lunch eligibility, and new teacher. 
  
 These descriptive findings about districts and teachers suggest that the frequency 
with which incentives are offered appears to be endogenously related to other district 
characteristics that are known to negatively influence teacher retention.  Therefore, to 
mitigate the potential problem caused by the endogeneity of incentive frequency, and to 
create an analysis sample with plausible counterfactual comparison groups, I created a 
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sub-sample for analysis that includes only teachers who taught in the same districts, 
either in the survey year prior to the offering of an incentive, or in the survey year during 
the time when incentives were offered.  By only including teachers who taught in the 
same districts, but who responded to surveys at different times, I am able to approximate 
treatment and control groups in which pre-treatment differences in district characteristics 
are minimized because the districts are the same, except for the differences in time.  
 In order to understand if teachers who taught in districts before and after 
incentives are actually comparable, I also analyzed descriptive statistics of this subgroup 
(Table 26).  In this analysis, my sample size is reduced by more than half, to just under 
32,000 teachers, but the groups have similar distributions across urban and rural areas, as 
well as across the South and Midwest.  However, more teachers in districts in the 
Northeast were exposed to incentive policies after they were added.  Additionally, the 
schools where teachers taught after incentives were added had higher percentages of 
Hispanic and ELL students, although percentages of Black students were similar.  In 
addition, there were more students eligible for the lunch program after incentives were 
added. The findings for Hispanic students likely reflect rapidly changing demographics 
and population growth of Hispanics between 1999 and 2007.   
In addition, fewer teachers who taught in districts after incentives were offered 
were either fully certified or taught under collective bargaining agreements than those 
who taught in the same districts previously.  The differences in union status may be due 
to state level changes in collective bargaining laws during this time period, such as those 











Total 0.55 0.45 
City 0.36 0.32 
Rural 0.21 0.24 
South 0.41 0.41 
Northeast 0.09 0.07 
Midwest 0.13 0.16 
West 0.36 0.35 
Collective bargaining 0.42 0.53 
Charter  0.01 0.02 
% Black 0.19 0.20 
% Hispanic 0.18 0.13 
% IEP 0.14 0.15 
% LEP 0.08 0.06 
% Lunch eligible 0.44 0.42 
New teacher 0.19 0.17 
Shortage-field teacher 0.23 0.24 
Elementary 0.30 0.30 
Middle 0.13 0.14 
High school 0.49 0.49 
Combined grade 0.08 0.07 
Fully certified 0.85 0.87 
Female 0.31 0.31 
Male 0.69 0.69 
Stem BA 0.13 0.12 
T-test statistics. Mean differences significant at the 0.01 percent level. Mean differences not significant for South, West, Charter, % 
Black, %IEP, Shortage-field, Elementary, Middle, High School, Gender, Stem BA. 
  
 I also conducted descriptive analysis of the outcomes, utilizing the full fixed 
effects analysis sample.  Table 29 provides results for teachers who were and were not 
retained in their school for one year.  In this sample, a total of 16 percent of teachers were 
not retained in their school; this is compared to 14 percent in the analysis sample utilized 
in the IV analysis in research questions one and two.  In this sample, teachers who are 
and are not retained are equally likely to be teaching in urban areas.  However, those who 
are retained are more likely to be found in the Midwest, and to teach in schools that have 
collective bargaining for teachers.  Those who were not retained were more likely to 
leave schools with higher average percentages of Black students, and students eligible for 
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the subsidized lunch program.  However, the schools of those who did and did not remain 
had similar populations of Hispanic, LEP and IEP students.  Elementary and middle 
school teachers were more likely to leave their schools, compared to high school 
teachers.  Finally, teachers who were not retained were much more likely to be new 
teachers, as well as uncertified.   
Table 30 
Characteristics of Teachers Who Did and Did Not Remain in their School After 1 Year 
Variable Name 
(teacher level) 
Retained in school  
(n=67,900) 
Not retained in school  
(n=13,050) 
Total 0.84 0.16 
City 0.28 0.28 
Rural 0.30 0.29 
South 0.38 0.41 
Northeast 0.11 0.10 
Midwest 0.22 0.19 
West 0.29 0.30 
Collective bargaining 0.47 0.44 
Charter  0.01 0.01 
% Black 0.15 0.18 
% Hispanic 0.12 0.13 
% IEP 0.14 0.14 
% LEP 0.06 0.07 
% Lunch eligible 0.40 0.43 
New teacher 0.15 0.25 
Shortage-field teacher 0.23 0.25 
Elementary 0.28 0.30 
Middle 0.13 0.15 
High school 0.50 0.46 
Combined grade 0.08 0.09 
Fully certified 0.89 0.81 
Female 0.69 0.68 
Male 0.31 0.31 
Stem BA 0.13 0.13 
Mean differences significant at p<.01. Mean differences not significant for city, rural, male, female, STEM BA 
 
 Interestingly, descriptive findings for the Barron’s undergraduate competitiveness 
rankings outcome show greater variation in the distribution of teachers in the larger fixed 
effects analysis sample than was found in the sample for the first two research questions 
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(Figure 2).  In the previous sample, over half the teachers attended colleges ranked either 
competitive or competitive plus.  In this sample, that combined number drops to less than 
50 percent.  In the previous sample, teachers with backgrounds from colleges ranked in 
the non-competitive and less competitive categories comprised less than 25 percent of the 
sample.  In this case, teachers with those backgrounds make up approximately 37 percent 
of the sample.  By contrast, in the previous analysis sample, teachers from colleges 
ranked very competitive or very competitive plus, made up over 15 percent of the sample, 
where in the fixed effects sample, teachers with these backgrounds are about 12 percent.  
All of these findings indicate that the previous sample, which was smaller and arguably 
less nationally representative, consisted of teachers who had stronger academic 
backgrounds than those found in the larger population of teachers, and that the results of 
those analyses are likely only generalizable to states with populations of teachers more 
similar to the teachers represented by that sample.       
Figure 2 
Distribution of Teachers by Barron’s Rank of Undergraduate Institution 
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 Despite the differences in the distribution of teacher academic backgrounds 
between the fixed effects analysis sample and the previous analysis sample, differences in 
the characteristics of teachers by undergraduate academic rank show similar patterns to 
those presented previously (Table 31).  For example, as in the earlier analysis, new and 
charter school teachers have academic backgrounds that were rated more highly than 
other teachers.  Teachers in the Northeast graduated from colleges that have an average 
Barron’s rank that is almost a full point higher than teachers in the other regions of the 
country, and teachers who are fully certified graduated from colleges with lower 
academic rankings.  Finally, teachers in districts with collective bargaining rights 
graduated from colleges with slightly higher college rankings than other teachers.  Given 
that the previous sample only contained teachers with full bargaining rights, the 
differences between this sample and the last one is likely a reflection of this difference.   
Table 31 
Characteristic of Teachers by Barron’s Rank of Undergraduate Institution, Fixed Effects Sample 
Variable Name 
(Teacher Level) Variable=1 Variable=0 
District offers shortage-field incentives 2.9 3.1 
City 3.0 3.0 
Rural 2.7 3.0 
South 2.8 3.1 
Northeast 3.8 2.9 
Midwest 2.8 3.0 
West 3.0 3.0 
Collective bargaining contract 3.1 2.9 
Charter school teacher 3.6 3.0 
New teacher 3.5 2.8 
Shortage-field teacher 2.9 2.9 
Elementary 2.9 3.0 
Middle 3.0 3.0 
High School 3.0 2.9 
Fully certified 2.9 3.5 
Female teacher 3.0 3.0 
Has STEM BA 3.2 3.0 




 Finally, I conducted analysis of the descriptive differences between shortage field 
teachers who were teaching both in and out-of-field in this sample (Table 32).  Here, only 
25 percent of shortage field teachers are teaching infield.  However, given that over 70 
percent of teachers with undergraduate degrees in STEM fields were teaching infield, and 
only 1 percent were teaching out-of-field, it appears that most of the out-of-field teaching 
was done by special and bilingual education teachers.  Infield teachers taught more 
frequently at schools with lower mean populations of Hispanic, ELL, IEP and lunch 
eligible students, although they are also found at schools with slightly more Black 
students.  Infield teachers were more likely to teach at the high school level, and were 
also more likely to be both male, and fully certified.  In addition, while 63 percent of 
infield teachers teach in districts with collective bargaining agreements, only 46 percent 
of out-of-field teachers worked under such contracts.  This finding also further 
illuminates how the sample utilized for the previous analysis differs from a more 













Characteristics of Infield and Out-of-field Shortage-field Teachers 






Total 0.25 0.75 
City 0.30 0.30 
Rural 0.31 0.28 
South 0.39 0.39 
Northeast 0.12 0.12 
Midwest 0.22 0.22 
West 0.27 0.28 
Collective bargaining 0.63 0.46 
Charter  0.00 0.01 
% Black 0.17 0.16 
% Hispanic 0.10 0.13 
% IEP 0.14 0.16 
% LEP 0.04 0.06 
% Lunch eligible 0.37 0.42 
New teacher 0.17 0.16 
Elementary 0.11 0.24 
Middle 0.12 0.18 
High school 0.68 0.47 
Combined grade 0.08 0.11 
Fully certified 0.88 0.86 
Female 0.63 0.69 
Male 0.37 0.31 
Stem BA 0.71 0.01 




Empirical Results: Research Question 3 
 For the first fixed effects analysis with the retained in school outcome, I utilized 
the full analysis sample, and included control variables for districts that never offered an 
incentive, or offered one every year.  The coefficient of interest is for the interaction 
indicating shortage field teachers who taught in districts the year the incentive was 
offered.  In the naive model (Table 33), I do not include any covariates, but have 3,130 
district fixed effects.  In the second model, I include teacher and school control variables.  
In this model, due to missing data on some covariates, I loose about 4,000 teachers, but 
still maintain a sample of 77,000 teachers.  Based on the regional analysis presented in 
the last chapter, I also conduct a sub analysis that eliminates districts located in the Mid-
West.  The coefficient of interest in all models is estimated at about 0.01, and is not 
significant in any specification.  In addition, the confidence interval in all models is 
estimated between approximately -0.004 and 0.02, indicating that the effect is very small, 
at best.     
Table 33 









Shortage Field*Incentive  0.009 0.010 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Shortage Field Teacher -0.021** -0.022** -0.019** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.853** 0.800** 0.788** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) 
Observations 80,950 76,930 60,530 
Number of district fixed effects 3,130 3,110 2,250 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.07 
*significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Standard errors in parentheses 
Models 2 and 3 contain controls for teacher gender, teacher STEM BA, teacher fully certified, New teacher, school percent Black, 
Hispanic, lunch eligible, IEP, LEP. Other controls include school level, charter school flag, and collective bargaining contract. 




I also conducted analysis on the reduced sample in which I included only teachers in 
those districts that reported a change in shortage-field incentive policy between survey 
years (Table 33).  In these models, the variable of interest is the interaction between 
being a shortage-field teacher, and teaching in the district the year the incentive was 
offered.  Again, in these models the effect is estimate near zero, and is not statistically 
significant.  Moreover, the estimate, nor the confidence interval changes much with either 
the inclusion of control variables, or with the elimination of districts in the mid-west.    
Table 34 








Incentive 0.010 0.006 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Shortage Field -0.022** -0.018* -0.016* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Incentives*SF -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 0.844** 0.770** 0.765** 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) 
Observations 31,910 30,520 26,009 
Number of district fixed effects 940 930 730 
R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.06 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Standard errors in parentheses 
Models 2 and 3 contain controls for teacher gender, teacher STEM BA, teacher fully certified, New teacher, school percent Black, 
Hispanic, lunch eligible, IEP, LEP. Other controls include school level, charter school flag, and collective bargaining contract. 
Survey year fixed-effects are included. 
 
 In the next set of analysis, I examined the impact of adding an incentive on the 
Barron’s rank of teacher’s undergraduate institution, for teachers surveyed in districts 
before and after incentive policies were reported (Table 34).  In these models, the 
Barron’s outcome is standardized so that coefficients can be interpreted as standard 
deviation units. Although these models utilize the same sample as the second set of 
models estimated above, the sample sizes are reduced due to missing undergraduate 
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institutions for some teacher. Note however that the number of district fixed effects 
remains constant.   
For these analyses, I estimated two models, one with and one without control 
variables.  The coefficient of interest is not statistically significant in either model, 
however.  In the naïve model, the confidence interval ranges from -0.07 to 0.03, and the 
full model is spans from -0.04 to 0.07 which indicates that in both models the data are too 
noisy to approximate whether the effect is positive, negative, or actually zero.  In these 
models it is interesting to note that model 1, which includes only the shortage field and 
incentive indicators as well as survey year, and district fixed effects, 19 percent of the 
variation in the outcome is explained by these factors, but that adding in all the teacher 
and school level covariates increases the R-squared by only 4 percentage points.  This 
finding indicates that the explained variation in teacher quality, as measured by academic 
background, is greatest between districts, as opposed to within districts.  
Table 35 






Incentives*SF -0.020 0.012 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
Shortage Field -0.040* -0.076** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
Incentives 0.034* 0.020 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant -0.009 -0.067* 
 (0.012) (0.034) 
Observations 27,420 26,230 
Number of district fixed effects 940 930 
R-squared 0.19 0.23 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Standard errors in parentheses 
Model 2 contain controls for teacher gender, teacher STEM BA, teacher fully certified, New teacher, school percent Black, Hispanic, 
lunch eligible, IEP, LEP. Other controls include school level, charter school flag, and collective bargaining contract. Survey year fixed 





 In the final analyses utilizing the sample of teachers who taught in districts before 
and after incentive policies changed, I also examined the impact of incentives on whether 
shortage-field teachers were teaching infield or out-of-field.  Because this further 
restriction on the data limited the analysis to only shortage-field teachers, these analyses 
are conducted on a limited sample of just 7,500 teachers.  In addition, while they contain 
district fixed effects, the variable of interest is the single indicator for whether or not 
teachers taught in districts that offered shortage-field incentives.  In both the naïve model, 
and the model containing all school and teacher covariates, the estimate is 0.013, and is 
not statistically significant.  In addition, the confidence interval in both models ranges 
from -0.007 to 0.03, indicating that the true value may be positive, but is likely very 
small.  In addition, here the R-squared in the first model is 0.41 meaning that 40 percent 
of the variation in whether or not shortage field teachers are teaching infield or not is 
explained by cross district variation, as opposed to within district variation. This finding 
is supported by the fact that the inclusion of school and teacher level variable increases 
the R-squared only slightly.  
Table 36 






Incentives 0.013 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Constant 0.504** 0.378** 
 (0.008) (0.024) 
Observations 7,520 7,189 
Number of district fixed effects 940 930 
R-squared 0.41 0.43 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Standard errors in parentheses 
Model 2 contains controls for teacher gender, teacher STEM BA, teacher fully certified, New teacher, school percent Black, 
Hispanic, lunch eligible, IEP, LEP. Other controls include school level, charter school flag, and collective bargaining contract. 






In this sub-analysis, I conducted fixed effects analysis examining changes in 
teacher outcomes over time, in districts that experienced changes in incentive policies 
from between rounds of the SASS.  Although I was unable to detect statistically 
significant results, the study was limited to finding outcomes over a relatively short 
period of time.  Specifically, all teachers in these analysis were only tracked for one year, 
and only a small minority of districts in this analysis were surveyed more than twice, 
meaning that most districts only accounted for one year prior, and one year after a 
change.  Because there were only a relatively small number of teachers surveyed within 
districts each year, detecting a statistically significant result within a single district over 
one year may have been too difficult.  In addition teachers included in these analyses 
were different from those included in the analysis sample in the last chapter.  
Specifically, this sample included teachers who did have collective bargaining rights, 

















In this dissertation, I utilized three waves of the national Schools and Staffing 
Survey to investigate the efficacy of financial incentives for increasing retention and 
improving recruitment of shortage-field teachers.  In the first two of three research 
questions, I was able to identify a causal pathway between the provision of incentives and 
teacher outcomes by utilizing an instrumental variable difference-in-differences model.  
By finding an external instrument that is related to the policy or treatment of interest, but 
that is related to the outcome only via the treatment, this method allows for the 
approximation of comparable treatment and control groups, and is recognized as one of 
the stronger quasi-experimental methods available for obtaining causal findings from 
observational data.  In this case, I exploited the exogenous variation in differing national 
teacher union policies on the provision of financial incentives for teachers in shortage-
fields.  Specifically, I was able to create comparable groups between teachers who 
worked in AFT affiliated districts and those who worked in districts affiliated with the 
NEA.  In this case, the counterfactual was plausible because there was a strong link 
between teaching in an AFT district and the likelihood of receiving an incentive, but no 
readily identifiable link between union affiliation and actual teacher outcomes.  
Moreover, by combining the IV with the difference between shortage and non-shortage 
field teachers in the same districts, I was able to further improve the plausibility of the 
findings because non-shortage field teachers in AFT districts were likely not impacted by 
other potential effects of AFT affiliation.              
Because the identification strategy relied upon district affiliation with one of the 
two major national teachers unions, the analysis sample utilized for research questions 1 
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and 2 was strictly limited to districts that were governed by collectively bargained 
contracts, as well as those that could be positively identified as being represented by 
either the AFT or the NEA.  Therefore, the results of the analysis are only generalizable 
to the population of teachers and districts that are found in states that have collective 
bargaining policies for public sector employees.  
Results of these analyses indicate that shortage-field incentives have a positive 
causal relationship to increasing the retention of shortage-field teachers in schools, for at 
least an additional year.  In addition, because the effects were found only for in-school 
retention, and not for retention in teaching, it is likely that these kinds of incentives work 
best for keeping teachers from leaving some schools for better positions in other schools, 
rather than for convincing those who are not committed to teaching to remain in the 
profession.   
Another aspect of the finding for the first research question was that the impacts 
were strongest in regions that are experiencing elevated levels of shortages.  This trend is 
likely because in these areas, greater levels of shortages means there are more 
opportunities for experienced teachers to move schools, as positions in more desirable 
teaching environments become available more frequently.  In addition, in areas that have 
experienced overall worse employment conditions and lower salaries, like the Midwest, 
there are potentially fewer options for teachers to move positions, which is likely why 
there was no incentive impact in that region. 
Overall, however, the findings for the analysis for the first research question 
suggest that providing financial incentives to teachers in shortage-fields is an effective 
tool for keeping existing teachers in their schools.   
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I also utilized the same IV difference-in-differences framework to examine the 
impact of shortage-field incentives on two recruitment outcomes.  Specifically, I 
analyzed whether districts that offered incentives employed shortage-field teachers with 
stronger academic backgrounds than other districts, as well as whether teachers in these 
districts were more likely to be teaching in the subject area for which they were trained.  
However, in these analyses I did not find any statistically significant relationship between 
the provision of incentives and the quality of teachers teaching in these districts.   
These null results may have been related to the fact that there was very little 
variation in the backgrounds of teachers in the sample.  Specifically, the measure of 
academic background I used was the Barron’s rank of teachers’ undergraduate institution.  
Descriptively, what I found was that despite 9 potential ranking categories, more than 
half of all teachers in the sample had graduated from schools ranked “competitive”, 
making it difficult to find differences across the population of teachers.  
I also undertook an additional fixed effects analysis in which I isolated districts 
that did and did not offer incentives in different years of the survey. By comparing 
teachers within the same districts, before and after incentive policies were adopted, I was 
able to examine the impact of policy changes over time.  By utilizing district level fixed 
effects, I was able to hold constant all district characteristics so that the variation in the 
model was only between teachers and schools in the same districts.  This strategy was 
designed to create a counterfactual group in which teachers in the same district, and 
arguably teaching within similar district environments at different times, were compared 
to one another.  In this sub-analysis, I did not find any statistically significant 
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relationships between the addition of a policy with a district, and changes in either 
retention or recruitment outcomes.  
In addition, in order to provide some context to the results found in the empirical 
analysis, I also utilized the existing models and salary data to try to estimate the 
magnitude of the financial incentive. Although the results of these analyses do not claim 
to make a causal connection between specific dollar amounts and teacher outcomes, they 
do provide illustrative evidence of the size of incentives that teachers are likely being 
offered in districts that do provide them.  These models expose regional variation in 
salaries received by shortage-field teachers generally, and between districts that do and 
do not offer incentives.  These models have implications for the empirical models 
because they show that salaries in the Midwest particularly are lower than in other parts 
of the country. In addition, the incentive estimate in this region was actually negative 
which indicates that the empirical models are ineffective for estimating impacts of salary 
enhancements for shortage-field teachers in this region, using these data.  Overall, 
however, having a range of dollar values with which to contextualize the empirical 
findings is useful from a policy standpoint because it helps frame the discussion in terms 
of potential costs for districts, and benefits for teachers. 
Finally, I also conducted a document review of a subsample of union negotiated 
contracts from districts that were positively identified as offering incentives in the SASS.  
The findings from these analyses were particularly helpful in providing some evidence 
about how incentives are actually applied.  They were particularly helpful for 
understanding possible reasons for null findings on the recruitment outcomes because 
they presented a picture of districts that utilize incentives mainly to secure specific 
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candidates from the existing labor pool, rather than using incentives as marketing or 
recruitment tools to entice potential teachers who may not otherwise consider a career in 
teaching. 
The vagueness of some of the language in these contracts may also help 
illuminate why I find differential effects in the Midwest than in other regions of the 
country.  Namely, leaving in enough language to allow incentives in times of need 
without tying districts to extra financial commitments when they are unnecessary may 
provide flexibility to respond to changing local labor market conditions. Thus, districts in 
the Midwest with vague language contracts may still claim to offer shortage-field 
incentives because the option is available to them, without actually providing a financial 







One potential criticism of this study is that districts represented by the AFT and 
the NEA are not really comparable, either because the AFT tends to represent more urban 
districts, or because the AFT is “known” to be a more progressive union.  To address the 
first point, although it is true that the AFT tends to represent more urban districts than the 
NEA, the relationship is not absolute.  Both unions represent a mix of urban, suburban, 
and rural affiliates of all sizes.  But more importantly, the fact that the AFT has a 
tendency to represent more urban districts potentially only serves to strengthen the 
understanding of the results of this study.  Specifically, factors associated with urban 
districts such as high levels of poverty and high minority student populations tend to be 
associated with greater turnover of teachers, not less.  Thus, the finding that AFT districts 
have a higher likelihood of offering incentives and in turn are more likely to retain 
shortage field teachers serves to increase rather than decrease the plausibility that the 
finding is a result of the incentives, and not a result of the AFT affiliation.   
As to the idea that the AFT has a reputation for being a more progressive union 
than the NEA, this is also true.  Under the direction of Albert Shanker for more than three 
decades, the AFT historically has supported many educational reforms, such as charter 
schools and the development of Peer Assistance and Review teacher evaluation systems 
that are considered progressive, but which have been resisted by the NEA (Kahlenberg, 
2007).  However, far from undermining the results of this study, the fact that the AFT 
offers different policy stances than the NEA was crucial to the development of this 
research.  I needed variation between the unions to create an effective instrument.  
However, the only policy of which I am aware that the AFT supports that distinguishes 
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between types of teachers within districts is the use of differentiated pay for shortage-
field teachers.  Otherwise, support for reform policies is generally designed to bolster the 
professional lives of all the teachers represented by either union.  However, the reform-
minded reputation of the AFT does mean that the difference-in-differences element in the 
IV analysis is crucial for providing additional plausibility for the findings.  With this 
element of the study design, I am not just comparing AFT teachers to NEA teachers; 
rather I am comparing outcomes for teachers of different subjects, teaching under the 
same contract conditions to each other, as well as to the outcomes of teachers in NEA 
districts.          
In addition to these substantive concerns, the data provided by SASS about the 
availability of incentives is an extremely noisy measure.  The survey only asks a district 
official whether or not incentives are provided, but does not offer any further illumination 
on the issue.  The 1999 version of the survey did ask districts to specify for which 
subjects incentives were offered, but the level of detail provided by these sub-questions 
was cut from the two subsequent survey administrations.  Although I sacrificed some 
level of detail, I chose to use the more blunt question that was asked across all survey 
waves, rather than limiting the sample size by using only the wave of the survey that 
contained the greater level of detail.    
Moreover, because the survey does not ask districts to answer any questions about 
the size of the incentives, I was left to estimate their magnitude using salary data and 
empirical models which provide only a very gross estimate of any differential actually 
received by shortage-field teachers.  That said, considering the variability and vagueness 
of actual incentive implementation highlighted by the teacher contract document analysis, 
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it is possible that these empirical estimates are at least as accurate as a direct survey 
question would have been.  Moreover, the SASS did contain one teacher level question 
about how much teachers are paid for a variety of extra activities, including the receipt of 
shortage-field incentives.  I did not employ this question because it asked teachers for a 
single bonus amount for any activity ranging from coaching activities to student 
achievement incentives, and parsing out shortage-field incentives would have been 
impossible.  However, considered in light of the document analysis, teachers who are 
simply placed higher on the salary schedule may very well be unaware that they are even 
receiving a bonus, so the question, even if asked, may nonetheless garner noisy data.    
Overall, the lack of accurate data about the size of incentives offered to specific 
teachers in specific districts limits these analyses in two ways.  First, I was unable to fully 
explore the impact of shortage-field incentives in relation to the labor market in which 
they are located.  Although the region-specific analyses were supportive of the idea that 
differing labor market conditions strongly impact the efficacy of shortage-field 
incentives, being able to match districts to specific local labor market conditions, 
including salaries offered in comparable non-teaching fields and local unemployment 
rates would have been more illuminating, and suggests a potential avenue for further 
research that utilizes richer local data sources.   
In addition, the data available for incentive estimates were not robust enough to 
allow me to investigate whether or not incentive magnitude is impacted by local labor 
market conditions. For example, are larger incentives enough to overcome the larger 
opportunity costs created by greater teaching and non-teaching wage differentials in 
different locations? Or, what is the impact of larger incentives serving as compensating 
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differentials in more challenging school settings? Essentially, I am unable to answer 
questions about the equilibrium point at which shortage-field incentives can be used to 
shift teacher supply curves, and whether those shifts differ by location.  These too are 
questions that may be investigated in future research with more fine-grained data.     
In addition to the issue of the data related specifically to shortage-field incentives, 
there are several limitations with the outcomes utilized in this study.  The two retention 
outcomes measured in-school and in-profession retention for just one year.  Because the 
SASS only contains follow-up data for one school year, it was not possible to determine 
if the incentives might have a cumulative effect over time.  In addition, given the findings 
utilized in the fixed effects analysis that indicate that many districts change their policies 
over time, it is unclear from the available data how long teachers who were offered 
incentives actually maintained them.  However, given that the AFT policy is to actually 
place teachers high on the salary scale when they are hired, and the fact that many of the 
contracts reviewed for the document analysis reflected that policy, it is possible that once 
teachers have been placed on a specific step, they are not moved from that position on the 
scale, even if the policy changes.  If this is the case, however, it is likely that the 
implementation of incentives occurs only when new teachers are hired, and are not 
applied retroactively to existing shortage field teachers in the district.  The lack of clarity 
in how the specific districts in this sample actually applied incentives means that there is 
also a lack of clarity about whether specific teachers in this sample actually received an 
incentive.  Given this uncertainty, the fact that an effect on retention was nevertheless 
detected suggests that results may be understated.  
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One potential problem with the Barron’s academic ranking index is that it may or 
may not accurately reflect teacher quality.  Although there is some literature to suggest 
that teacher academic background is linked to teacher pedagogic ability (Loewenberg 
Ball, 2008), as with so many other measureable proxies of teacher quality, undergraduate 
ranking nonetheless provide a noisy signal of teacher ability.  Thus, the fact that there is a 
lack of variation in teacher academic backgrounds, and that most teachers graduated from 
schools from the lower end of the competitiveness rankings is not necessarily a clear 
indicator of the quality of the overall teacher labor pool.  However, the lack of variation 
does suggest that changes to the available teacher labor pool will likely need to address 
more systemic issues surrounding the preparation and development of teachers from a 
wider range of institutions than can likely be addressed either by shortage-field 
incentives, or this dissertation.   
Although I originally designed the fixed-effects sub-analysis to provide support 
for the findings in research questions 1 and 2, I was unable to identify any statistically 
significant impacts within districts over time.  At the same time, although I had null 
findings using these models, they do not undermine the main findings for the original 
research questions because the analysis sample used here represented mostly different 
teachers than those used in the first analysis sample. In particular, the sample used to 
address the first and second research questions was limited to teachers in districts with 
full collective bargaining rights. By contrast, almost half the teachers in the fixed effects 
sub-analysis were not covered by collective bargaining.  This distinction is important 
because collective bargaining and the provision of union negotiated contracts likely 
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influences the teacher work environment in ways that are significantly related to both 
recruitment and retention.   
Another possible limitation to the sub-analysis may be that although different 
teachers were sampled in the same districts in different years, the teachers who responded 
after the incentive policy change may have actually worked in the district under the 
policy conditions reported the first time the survey was administered, but not been 
selected to respond until the second or third survey round.  This sampling issue is 
important because a shortage-field teacher already hired into a district before an incentive 
policy was put into place may not be impacted despite the official policy change, 
especially if, as indicated by the document review, most incentives are only offered at the 
time of hire, and not retroactively.  Ideally, these analyses would have only focused on 
new teachers hired into the districts with policy changes, during the year of the survey. 
However, the size of the new teacher sample in the SASS was too small to parse to the 
level of new teachers teaching in districts with policy changes.   
Finally, although the before and after models sought to compare equivalent 
groups across time, because those models specifically focused on districts that were new 
incentive implementers, a span of a year of implementation may not have been enough 
for detectable impacts of incentives on within district change. For all these reason, the 
results of the IV difference-in-differences models should be considered more robust than 
those provided by the fixed effects models.  
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Links to Theory and Extant Literature 
The finding that districts with incentives are 17 percent more likely to retain 
teachers than comparable districts without incentives is consistent with results found in 
previous work examining the efficacy of shortage-field incentives in North Carolina 
(Clotfelter et al., 2008).  In addition, the mean estimate of an incentive magnitude of 
$1,600 found in this study is similar in magnitude to the $1,800 bonus paid to teachers in 
the North Carolina evaluation.  The results of the retention analyses therefore serve to 
confirm existing evidence about the positive impact of shortage-field incentives on 
teacher attrition.  They also expand the generalizability of the findings to include a 
variety of state policy settings, including those that, unlike North Carolina, require 
collective bargaining for public sector employees, as well as those in regions of the 
country that have experienced population increases and difficulty recruiting shortage-
field teachers.   
Moreover, the findings for the in-school teacher retention outcome support the 
theoretical predictions of the Roy Model, at least in part.  By offering shortage-field 
incentives, districts seek to close the wage gap between teaching and non-teaching 
professions for those in shortage-fields.  In doing so, the districts in this sample that 
offered incentives were able to reduce the economic opportunity cost to the profession for 
these teachers, and were successful in helping to retain their teachers.   
However, the Roy Model also predicts that wages will serve to impact the 
selection mechanisms influencing who chooses specific professions.  The fact that I was 
unable to identify impacts specifically for new teachers leaves this question open, and 
likely requires much larger samples of new shortage-field teachers in order to address 
satisfactorily.  In addition, the lack of variation in the academic backgrounds of teachers 
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also suggests that issues of selection into teaching are complicated earlier in the pipeline 
of teacher preparation.  Specifically, most teachers are still prepared for the profession 
through traditional preparation programs, the vast majority of which seem to be training 
teachers who attended colleges of mediocre academic reputation.  Although it is unclear 
from these data why this occurs, the consequence is that lack of variation in the pool of 
people who become teachers means that shortage-field incentives offered only to those 
prospective hires who have already entered the teacher labor market are ineffective for 
changing the selection mechanisms of workers into teaching.  The lag time created 
between selecting into a teacher preparation program and being hired into a teaching job 
where an incentive may be offered complicates the selection predictions of the Roy 
model.  
Moreover, the recruitment findings are also well understood in light of the 
theoretical discussion around asymmetric information, and the lack of ability of districts 
to identify quality teachers at the point of hire.  In all likelihood the districts in this 
sample relied on standard mechanisms for identifying candidates, including credentials 
and degrees, regardless of the quality of the institution that granted them.  However, since 
these credentials only provide weak signals of teacher quality, it is unsurprising that 
districts were unable to alter the kinds of teachers they hired, particularly in a market in 
which there is little variation, at least in terms of the academic backgrounds of those 
available to teach.  Together these findings confirm previous research which suggests that 
labor market sorting is likely not affected by changes in salary incentives for teachers 
(Fowler, 2003; Liu et al., 2004). 
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Furthermore, results from the document review help further illuminate these null 
findings.  Specifically, these analyses suggest that the current implementation and 
utilization of shortage-field incentives as a recruiting tool is limited to securing those who 
have already self-selected into the teaching labor market, for specific positions in specific 
schools.  However, another mechanism by which incentives could work is to appeal to a 
wider candidate pool for teaching positions in shortage-fields.  Given that so many 
teachers actually assigned to teach mathematics and science are teaching out of their field 
of expertise, it seems a missed opportunity for districts that do offer incentives, but do not 
currently provide them in a systematic fashion.  Specific financial amounts and clear 
guidelines about how shortage-field incentives are to be distributed could potentially 
allow districts to market incentives more aggressively to college students and new 
graduates with degrees in these subject fields, opening a window into the profession for 
students who may be interesting in teaching, but who currently hesitate because of 
teaching’s reputation for poor pay.  Suggestions for future research include the 
investigation of whether better information about the availability of incentives serves to 
influence the career selection process of college students in STEM fields. 
As discussed, the findings from the fixed effects analyses executed in research 
question three did not confirm the main findings from the IV models utilized in research 
questions one and two.  In addition, the sample utilized for the different analyses differed, 
particularly in relation to the number of teachers teaching under collective bargaining 
contracts.  More than other sample differences, this factor may have influenced the 
difference in results because teachers who have unions to help them address grievances 
may have overall higher retention rates because unions allows them exercise “voice”, 
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rather than simply “exit” as has been described as one of the main functions of unions 
(Hirschman, 1970).  Despite controlling for collective bargaining in the models, having a 
large sample of teachers working under a mixed variety of contract circumstances may 
have nonetheless influenced the ability to detect significant findings for the outcomes of 
interest.   
Finally, the analyses presented in this dissertation serve to contribute to some new 
and emerging research that seeks to provide more quantitative nuance to the 
understanding of the role of teachers’ unions, and the heterogeneity in the kinds of 
contracts that govern teachers’ work (Strunk, 2011; Strunk & Grissom, 2010).  By 
utilizing the differences in specific policy stances to instrument for policy effects, this 
study suggests a possible new direction for the development of similar instruments, or of 
the same instrument to analyze the impacts of other union and/or contract policies.  In 
addition, much of the existing policy rhetoric about teachers’ unions fails to make 
distinctions between the differing policy outlooks of the nation’s two largest teachers’ 
unions.  All too often teachers’ unions are painted with one brush as monolithic obstacles 
to reform initiatives.  By parsing the differing policy stances of the AFT and the NEA 
this dissertation demonstrates that differences in policy stances have real causal 




Although this dissertation examined the role of shortage-field incentives in the 
retention and recruitment of teachers in shortage sub-fields, the policy implications apply 
more broadly to the teaching profession as a whole.  This is because although I have 
demonstrated that shortage-field incentives are effective for increasing retention of 
shortage-field teachers, the findings also beg the question of whether we want to retain 
the teachers we have.  In the short-term, all evidence affirms that retaining current 
teachers in areas where we already have shortages makes good educational as well as 
economic and policy sense.  As discussed in chapter 1, constantly replacing teachers 
jeopardizes student achievement, and costs districts resources that could be better 
invested.  Shortage-field incentives are likely an effective mechanism for addressing 
these problems.  At the same time, evidence about teacher quality presented in both the 
literature review and as evidence in this dissertation suggests that although improvements 
in shortage-field teaching are needed just to obtain quality parity with current non-
shortage field teaching, a long-term prescription for improving teacher quality overall is 
not limited to teachers in shortage-fields. 
As Labaree discusses, the policy environment is currently in the process of 
coalescing around a view of education as a consumer commodity, and a private good.  
One of the implications of this ideal, as well as the data-driven environment it has given 
rise to, is that there is an ever growing need for school districts to find ways to recruit and 
retain teachers who are more highly qualified to help students enhance their individual 
academic performance in order to ultimately become more competitive in the labor 
market.  In addition, as the labor market itself becomes more and more global the 
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pressure to create students who can compete, not just with other Americans, but with 
students all over the world, many of whom have superior technical skills to American 
students, is increasing as well.  Globalization means that not only increasing policy 
pressure to improve student performance, but increased pressure to improve teacher 
performance as well.  This convergence of policy ideals and labor market changes means 
that school inputs, which include the instructional capacity of teachers, must be more 
tightly coupled with school output, or student performance.  Since teachers are the most 
influential school-based resource for student achievement, the changing policy 
environment has greatly increased the pressure to both improve teacher quality, and to 
retain the best teachers.  However, findings also indicate that districts still need better 
tools for identifying high quality teachers who will both enter and remain in teaching.   
Thus, improving teacher quality is a long-term prospect.  Based on the lack of 
variation in teacher backgrounds, and the complications that are created in the hiring 
process due to poor signal quality, it seems that improving the self-selection of teachers 
into the profession should begin not in the district personnel office, but rather through the 
reform of teacher preparation programs, both in terms of quality of candidates recruited 
into them and the relevance of teacher preparation curricula for classroom teaching.   In 
order to meet the demands of an education system that is striving toward the ideal of 
developing workers who are competitive in an economy that meters out rewards for 
increased skills, teachers themselves must reasonably possess both deep knowledge of the 
level of skills that students will be expected to master, as well as the pedagogical acumen 
to transmit that knowledge to students in meaningful ways.  By recruiting teachers who 
themselves potentially possess mediocre levels of academic ability, it is unlikely that 
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students of these teachers will be able to develop skills of excellent quality. Thus, 
recruiting more academically able teachers, particularly in fields that require strong 
academic knowledge, should be a priority. 
At the same time, given the lack of connection that has been found between 
teacher credentials and student performance, in addition to changing the recruitment of 
teachers in teacher preparation programs, change in the content of how teachers are 
prepared to teach is also warranted. There is likely a reciprocal relationship between the 
quality of teachers who enter teaching programs, and the rigor of content provided by 
those programs. Logically, programs that seek to attract and prepare excellent teachers 
should begin by offering challenging, engaging, and relevant preparation curricula. That 
said, while these changes in teacher preparation are necessary, they are likely not 
sufficient to change the pool of potential teachers because high ability people likely seek 
to be both intellectually engaged, and financially rewarded.     
In order for high ability individuals to opt into teaching, they also likely need to 
feel that the increased investment involved in a more challenging preparation program 
will be met with some increase in payoff when they actually enter teaching.  Thus, in 
order to achieve overall improvements in the pipeline for quality teachers, there must be 
both better signals for districts, and increased rewards for teaching.  Districts may only be 
willing or able to raise salaries if they are better able to predict which job candidates will 
both perform to high standards in the classroom, and remain in the job for enough time to 
reduce the negative fiscal and academic costs associated with their attrition.  By the same 
token, increasing the supply of the kinds of teachers who, from the district perspective, 
will be worth the increased rewards will only occur if the payoff for teaching is increased.  
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In other words, although teacher compensation needs to increase, from a systemic 
perspective the increases are not needed to continue to recruit and retain teachers meeting 
the current qualification criteria. Rather they are needed to recruit and retain teachers who 
surpass current requirements.  From a policy perspective, teachers who surpass 
expectations and who can be recruited in the numbers necessary to staff the nations 
schools must be both prepared and compensated in new ways, and at scale.  This is 
because improvements in signal quality between teachers and district hiring managers is a 
symbiotic relationship where change can only occur if improvements on both ends are 
made simultaneously. 
Although achieving these goals will no doubt involve complex processes that 
engage many actors along the teacher development pipeline and hiring, one outcome may 
be that if districts can obtain better signals for identifying teachers, they will likely be 
able to both recruit and retain teachers who will be better qualified to both develop and 
enhance student learning in schools of all kinds.   
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Description of all control variable used in analytic models 
 
Variable Name Coding 
District Variables  
Census Region Categorical.  
Total k-12 enrollment Continuous 
District offers Shortage field incentives Indicator.  








Categorical. There were 3 categories available: 
collective bargaining, meet-and-confer, and no 
union negotiated agreement.  The variable was 
used to identify “meet-and-confer” states in R1 
and R2. In the analysis for R3, an indicator for 






Categorical. Indicators for urban, suburban, 
and rural were created. Suburban was used as 
the reference category in all models 
Union affiliation Indicator in which 1=AFT, and 0=NEA 
State Abbreviation 
Categorical. Each state assigned a single 
number 
Survey Year 
Indicator variables for the year each teacher 
participated in SASS were created, and used as 
fixed effects. 
  
School Variables  
Enrollment Continuous.  
% of students approved for lunch 
 
Continuous. School percentage of students 
eligible for the federal lunch program.   




Continuous. School percentages were not 
included in SASS. Counts of the number of all 
Hispanic students were divided by the school 
enrollment variable, and multiplied by 100. 




Continuous. School percentages were not 
included in SASS. Counts of the number of all 
Black students were divided by the school 
enrollment variable, and multiplied by 100. 
% students with IEPs Provided as a continuous percentage variable. 
% students classified as LEP Provided as a continuous percentage variable. 
Charter school Indicator. 1=charter 
  
Teacher Variables  










yearly salary from teaching. The other was 
yearly annual earnings.  The salary measure was 
the most applicable to this research. However 
it contained a fair amount of missing values.  
In places where annual teaching salary was 
missing, the annual yearly earnings value was 
imputed, if available.    
Years of teaching experience Continuous 
New teacher flag Indicator. 1=3 years of teaching or less.  
School grade level taught 
Categorical. Indicators were created for 
elementary, middle, high school, and 
combined. In all models, elementary was used 
as the reference category. 
Field of main assignment 
Categorical measure used to create indicators 
of shortage field teachers, and infield status. 
STEM teacher 
Indicator. 1= any teacher with a main teaching 
assignment of math or science. 
Special education teacher 
Indicator. 1= any teacher whose main 
assignment is teaching special education 
Bilingual Teacher 
Indicator. 1= any teacher whose main 
assignment is teaching bilingual education.  
Teacher gender 
Indicator. 1= Male. Female is the reference 
category. 
Teacher age Continuous 






Categorical variable indicating if a given 
teacher remained in the same school as a 
teacher, remained in the school in a non-
teaching position, moved to another school, 
left teaching, died. Used to create retention 
outcome variables. 
Retained in school 
Indicator. 1= teacher still teaching in the same 
school, 1 year later. 
Retained in teaching 
Indicator. 1= teacher still working as a 
classroom teacher. 
Year of BA degree Continuous.   
Type of certification 
Categorical. ??? used to create variable of 
whether or not a teacher was fully certified. 
Fully certified. 
Indicator. 1= teacher holds full state 
certification. 
Field of Bachelor's degree 
 
 
Categorical. Exhaustive list of possible fields 
of undergraduate study by teachers. Used to 
create measures of infield teaching status, and 
STEM BA. 
STEM BA 
Indicator. 1=Teachers with a BA in the field of 
their main teaching assignment. 
Infield teaching status 
Indicator. 1=teacher has a BA in a math or 
science subject area, including math or science 
education; teacher has a BA in a special 
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education related field; teacher has a BA in 
bilingual education or Spanish. 
Barron’s rank of undergraduate institution 
Ordinal. 1= least competitive and 9=most 
competitive. 
Frequency 
Ordinal. 1=teacher taught in district the first 
year incentive was offer, 2= teacher taught in 
district the second year the incentive was 
offered, etc. 
After. 
Indicator. 1= teacher taught in district the 
same year incentive was offered. 0=teacher 






Appendix Table 2: Criteria for Barron’s Rankings* 
Category 1972 1982 1992 2004 
Most Competitive     
GPA B+ to A B+ to A B+ to A B+ to A 
Class Rank Top 10-20% Top 10-20% Top 10-20% Top 10-20% 
Median SAT 675-800 625-800 625-800 655-800 
Median ACT 28 27+ 29+ 29+ 
Percent Admitted Small percentage Less than 33% Less than 33% Less than 33% 
Highly 
Competitive 
    
GPA B to B+ B to B+ B to B+ B to B+ 
Class Rank Top 20-30% Top 20-35% Top 20-35% Top 20-35% 
Median SAT 600-675 575-625 575-625 620-654 
Median ACT 26-28 26-27 26-28 26-28 
Percent Admitted Less than 25% 33-50% 33-50% 33-50% 
+(plus) SAT 675; ACT 27; 
accept less than 
25% 
SAT 615+; ACT 
27+; accept less 
than 25% 
SAT 616+; ACT 
28+; accept less 
than 25% 
SAT 645+; ACT 
28+; accept less 
than 25% 
Very Competitive     
GPA B- or above B- or above B- or above B- or above 
Class Rank Top 30-50% Top 35-50% Top 35-50% Top 35-50% 
Median SAT 550-600 525-575 525-575 573-619 
Median ACT 23-26 25-26 24-26 24-26 
Percent Admitted NA Less than 33% Less than 33% 50-66% 
+(plus) Median SAT/ACT 
scores close to top 
of range; less than 
33% admitted 
Sat 565+; ACT 
25+; Less than 33% 
admitted 
Sat 565+; ACT 
26+; Less than 33% 
admitted 
Sat 610+; ACT 
26+; Less than 33% 
admitted 
Competitive     
GPA C to B- C to B- C to B- C to B- 
Class Rank Top 30-50% Top 35-50% Top 35-50% Top 35-50% 
Median SAT 400-550 450-525 450-525 500-572 
Median ACT 21-23 19-22 21-23 21-23 
Percent Admitted 75-85% 75-85% 75-85% 75-85% 
+(plus) SAT 500+; ACT 
22+; Less than 50% 
accepted 
SAT 515+; ACT 
23+; Less than 50% 
accepted 
SAT 515+; ACT 
24+; Less than 50% 
accepted 
SAT 563+; ACT 
23+; Less than 50% 
accepted 
Less Competitive     
GPA C Below C Below C Below C 
Class Rank Top 75% Top 65% Top 65% Top 65% 
Median SAT Less 450 Less 450 Less 450 Less 500 
Median ACT Less 21 Less 19 Less 21 Less 21 
Percent Admitted 75% Top 85% Top 85% Top 85% 
Non-Competitive     
GPA HS diploma HS diploma HS diploma HS diploma 
Class Rank NA NA NA NA 








Percent Admitted All All 98% 98% 
*Reproduced from Documentation for the Restricted-Use NCES- Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness Index Data Files: 
1972, 1982, 1992, 2004, and 2008 
 	  
